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CODE VERSUS THE COMMON LAW 
 
STACEY L. DOGAN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Lawrence Lessig called the most recent battle ‘‘Hollywood v. Silicon 
Valley,’’1 but one could just as well dub it ‘‘Code v. The Common Law.’’ 
The content industries’ latest efforts to re-calibrate the balance of 
copyright2 imply that the United States copyright system has reached a 
crisis that cannot be resolved under existing law.  In particular, bills such 
as the Consumer Broadband & Digital Television Promotion Act3 would 
 
 
* Associate Professor, Northeastern University School of Law; Visiting Associate 
Professor (2003-04), Boston College Law School. This paper was presented at the Silicon 
Flatirons Symposium in February 2003. Thanks to participants in the symposium, particularly 
Mark Lemley, Phil Weiser, and Judge Steven Williams, for helpful input. I am also grateful to 
Doug Lichtman, Joe Liu, Tony Reese, and Glynn Lunney for many helpful suggestions, and 
to participants in faculty colloquia at Northeastern University School of Law and Rutgers 
School of Law, Camden. Angela Rochester provided excellent research assistance for this 
project. 
1. Lawrence Lessig, Hollywood v. Silicon Valley: Make New Code, Not War, CIO 
INSIGHT, June 17, 2002, available at http://www.cioinsight.com/print_article/ 
0,3668,a=28373,00.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2002); see also Drew Clark & Bara Vaida, Digital 
Divide, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Sept. 6, 2002, available at http://nationaljournal.com/ 
about/njweekly/stories/2002/0906nj1.htm (detailing the  history of the growing  tension 
between content industries and technology providers); Steven Levy, Glitterati vs. Geeks, 
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 14, 2002, available at http://msl1.mit.edu/ESD10/docs/glit_and_geeks.pdf 
(same). 
2. See Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, S. 2048, 107th 
Cong. (introduced Mar. 21, 2002); see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201- ---1202 (2000) (statute making it 
a violation of civil and criminal law to tamper with ‘‘rights-management’’ information, or to 
circumvent technology that controls access to copyrighted works or protects rights of copyright 
owners); Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, S. 505, P.L. 105-298, 11 Stat. 2827 
(1998)  (extending  copyright  term).  See  generally  JESSICA  LITMAN,   DIGITAL 
COPYRIGHT 35-69  (2001)  (describing  history  of  expansionist  copyright  legislation  and 
interest group influence). 
3. Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, S. 2048, 107th Cong. 
(introduced Mar. 21, 2002). This bill was proposed in the 2001-02 legislative session but 
never passed out of committee, and has not been reintroduced in the current session. While 
this particular legislation appears to have fallen from the table for the time being, the federal 
government continues to consider other initiatives to mandate and standardize copy-protection 
technologies.  See, e.g., Digital Broadcast Copy Production, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
17 F.C.C.R. 16027 (2002) (initiating rulemaking proceeding to decide whether FCC should 
mandate   standardized   copy   protection   technology   for   digital   television);   cf.   Declan 
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usurp current standards of secondary copyright infringement in favor of a 
more aggressive approach against those whose technologies facilitate the 
copying of digital works. The proposal --    a mandate that technology 
developers embed specific copy-protection technology into hardware and 
software products --    would involve unprecedented levels of intrusion into 
the technology design process. A victory for Hollywood would thus 
represent a triumph not only of code law over common law, but also of 
legislated computer code over market-driven technologies.4 
Critics have catalogued the shortcomings of the Hollings bill: it 
tampers with the historically frantic pace of innovation in technology; it 
represents yet another capitulation to Hollywood; it threatens to deprive 
users of the right to make ‘‘fair use’’ of digital works.5 But few have 
focused on a fundamental question posed by the  legislation: Do  the 
disruptions caused by digital technology justify a rethinking of the core 
model for copyright in the United States? More specifically, should 
Congress convert copyright from a system focused primarily on 
enforcement of exclusive rights against individuals into one that spreads 
more broadly the responsibility for either preventing, or compensating 




McCullagh, Congressional Caucus Targets Piracy, CNET NEWS.COM, May 19, 2003, 
available at http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-1007908.html (last visited May 21, 2003) 
(describing new Congressional caucus ‘‘devoted to combating piracy and promoting strong 
intellectual property laws’’). See generally Randall C. Picker, From Edison to the Broadcast 
Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 281 (2003). 
4. By describing existing technologies as ‘‘market-driven,’’ I do not mean to suggest that 
they have all evolved in an efficiently functioning market lacking in externalities; to be sure, 
many of the technologies discussed in this paper have been driven exclusively by a demand for 
their infringing applications. But at least some ---- and maybe most ---- of the broad array of 
products covered in the Hollings proposal were designed primarily for neutral, non-infringing 
purposes, and the bill’s interference with these products strikes me as anti-market and 
unprecedented. 
5. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 1 (‘‘While Hollywood cries ‘theft,’ it uses Washington to 
ensure  that  a  vibrant  competitive  market  for  producing  and  distributing  content  on  the 
Internet is never realized.’’); Alex Salkever, Guard Copyrights, Don’t Jail Innovation, 
BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Mar. 27, 2002, available at www.businessweek.com/daily/dnflash/ 
mar2002/nf20020327_2364.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2002) (contending that the Hollings bill 
‘‘clearly flouts the interests of consumers’’ and is ‘‘more evidence that, when it comes to 
delivering content in the 21st century, the entertainment industry is hell-bent on stifling 
technology, rather than using it in ways that eventually could become highly profitable’’). 
6. Congress arguably already somewhat expanded the scope of responsibility for 
infringement when it passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which proscribes, among 
other things, the use or distribution of technologies that circumvent access and copy controls 
embedded in copyrighted works. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201. For an insightful critique of the 
economics of secondary liability and cost spreading in copyright law, see Douglas Lichtman & 
William Landes, Indirect Liability in Copyright Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 17 
HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 395 (2003). 
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The answers to these questions are less obvious than either side in 
the current debate would admit. Opponents of legislative action have 
both history and the Supreme Court on their side when they argue that 
only active infringers, and those closely related to them, should bear the 
costs of unauthorized copying.7 As these opponents point out, Congress 
has rarely used its copyright powers8  to tamper with new technologies, 
even those specifically designed to duplicate creative content.9 And the 
Supreme Court, in Sony v. Universal City Studios,10 declared that 
copyright holders should almost never have veto power over new 
technologies. The inducement objectives of copyright, the Court held, 
cannot justify liability against all parties whose products may be used to 
infringe, because such liability would expand the economic dominion of 
the copyright holder into markets that have nothing to do with their 
expression. Instead, the Court found copyright liability appropriate only 
against   manufacturers   of   technologies   with   no   ‘‘substantial   non- 
infringing use.’’11    Sony thus established that, under the common law of 






7. Existing  law  limits  liability  for  copyright  infringement  to  three  categories  of 
defendants: (1) those who themselves commit an act of infringement, see Religious Tech. Ctr. 
v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 
(direct infringement ‘‘requires some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a 
defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy by a third party’’); (2) those who provide 
substantial assistance to others’ acts of infringement, see Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia 
Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (defining a contributory infringer as ‘‘one 
who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the 
infringing conduct of another’’) (internal citations omitted); and (3) those who have a right and 
ability to supervise a direct infringer, and who obtain a direct financial benefit from her acts of 
infringement, see Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 
1963) (‘‘When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct financial 
interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials . . . the purposes of copyright law may be 
best effectuated by the imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of that exploitation.’’) 
(internal citations omitted). 
8. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (‘‘The Congress shall have Power . . . to promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to  Authors  and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.’’). 
9. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 
(1984) (Sony) (holding that copyright liability cannot extend to copying devices that have 
‘‘substantial non-infringing uses’’). Congress has occasionally changed the copyright law to 
account for new technologies, but has rarely done so by giving copyright holders injunctive 
power over the new technology. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 115 (compulsory license requirement 
added after the introduction of piano rolls); 17  U.S.C. §§ 1002-1007 (setting  forth  levy 
scheme for digital audio recording devices); see generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and 
Control  over  New  Technologies  of  Dissemination,  101  COLUM.  L.  REV.  1613  (2001) 
(reviewing history of courts’ and Congress’ treatment of new technologies). 
10.   Sony, 464 U.S. at 442. 
11. Id. 
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their products to satisfy the self-protective instincts of copyright 
holders.12 
Yet history and common law tell only part of the story. The world 
has changed, even since Sony.13 The combination of digital formats and 
the Internet has made it possible for individuals to make perfect copies of 
digital works and to distribute them around the world. The advent of 
file-sharing technologies has decentralized the distribution process, 
making  it  daunting  to  identify  and  take  action  against  individual 
infringers. Given the collective creativity and tenacity of those with an 
interest in such technologies, the legal arms of the content industries will 
arguably never keep pace with their development. Just as Grokster and 
KaZaA cropped up in the immediate wake of Napster,14 so will existing 
sharing and distribution tools give way to new generations of 





12. Because Sony involved an off-the-shelf technology product, rather than a service, the 
case left open the possibility that parties with an ongoing relationship with their customers 
might have a greater responsibility for preventing infringement. See Stacey L. Dogan, Is 
Napster a VCR? The Implications of Sony v. Universal City Studios for Napster and Other 
Internet-Related Actors, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 939 (2001) (considering Sony’s implications for 
Internet services). Both the Ninth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit have interpreted Sony to 
require some preventive actions by Internet actors, at least in certain circumstances. See A&M 
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021-24 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that Napster 
had an affirmative obligation to remove infringing files from its system); In re Aimster 
Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (indicating that even when an 
Internet service has significant noninfringing uses, ‘‘if the infringing uses are substantial then 
to avoid liability as a contributory infringer the provider of the service must show that it would 
have been disproportionately costly for him to eliminate or at least reduce substantially the 
infringing uses’’). 
13. The Supreme Court in Sony made clear that ‘‘it is Congress that has been assigned 
the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly’’ of copyright, 464 U.S. at 429, and that 
Congress, rather than the courts, should make any necessary adjustments to the copyright 
balance in response to technological change. Id. at 431 (‘‘Sound policy, as well as history, 
supports our consistent deference to Congress when major technological innovations alter the 
market for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional authority and the 
institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing interests that 
are inevitably implicated by such new technology.’’). 
14. See, e.g., John Borland and Gwendolyn Mariano, Looking for the Next Napster, 
CNET NEWS.COM, July 5, 2001, available at http://news.com.com/2009-1023-269454.html 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2003) (describing some of the emerging post-Napster file-trading 
networks). 
15. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free P2P 
File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2003) (draft at 5 & n. 12), available at 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/nnetanel/Levies_chapter.pdf (last  visited Sept. 29, 2003) 
(‘‘computer security experts maintain that no technological barrier can ultimately prevail over 
determined hackers who have physical access to the encrypted items, including, in this instance 
mass-marketed  CDs  and  DVDs,  personal  computers,  consumer  electronic  devices,  and 
software embedded in those items’’); John Borland, Freenet Keeps File-Trading Flame 
Burning,  CNET  NEWS.COM,  Oct.  28,  2002,  available at http://new.com.com/2100-1023- 
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This confluence of technological developments clearly threatens the 
traditional distribution model for movies, music, and other forms of 
creative expression. It also may threaten the economic model upon 
which our copyright laws are based. Under the United States 
Constitution, Congress has the power to grant authors exclusive rights in 
order to induce creative expression. If authors or their  assigns  can 
capture the core market for reproduction and distribution of their 
expression, they will arguably have an incentive to create and distribute. 
But in a digital, interconnected world, the dispersion of copying and 
distribution activities makes it more difficult for copyright holders to 
identify users who derive value from their works. At least theoretically, 
the inability to capture such value could ultimately jeopardize the 
incentive to produce and distribute creative expression. 
There is widespread disagreement over what, if anything, should be 
done about these threats. Some think that artists and publishers should 
accept that the world has changed and that they can no longer profit 
from exclusive copying and distribution rights.16 Others argue that the 
existing model of exclusive rights could serve the ends of copyright, if 
only publishers contained their greed; in this view, the public would 
willingly pay for copies of works if the content providers distributed them 




963459.html (last visited Jan.  27, 2003) (describing Freenet anonymous file-sharing 
technology). 
16. E.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and 
the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 268 (2002) (‘‘[I]n light 
of alternative methods for funding musicians, including statutory levies, denying the public 
access to music can no longer be justified as a necessary or desirable means for encouraging the 
creation of music.’’). 
17. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Arresting Technology: An Essay, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. 
L.J. 95, 118-19 (2001) (‘‘In cyberspace as in real space, most U.S. citizens (or ‘netizens’) are 
law abiding most of the time.  As long as it is reasonably convenient, efficient, and economical 
to gain access to a movie by renting a videocassette or DVD, ordering it through ‘pay-per- 
view,’ or watching it on cable television (all of which garner royalties for content owners), then 
few people are likely to invest a lot of time and energy in obtaining counterfeit copies of the 
movie or gaining unauthorized access to any copies.’’); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of 
Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
87 VA. L. REV. 813, 858-68 (2001) (advocating an ‘‘honor system’’ in which consumers 
regulate themselves: ‘‘All the public needs is some general statement, such as that found in 
copyright law, reflecting and reinforcing the principle that excessive unauthorized copying is 
improper’’). 
The early success of Apple’s ITunes, and of other recently-introduced technologies 
for authorized distribution of music files, support the view that at least some consumers will 
make use of legal alternatives to file-sharing. See, e.g., John Borland, Music Services Jump on 
ITunes Bandwagon, CNET  NEWS.COM, July 28, 2003, available at http://news.com.com/ 
2100-1027-5056162.html?tag=n1 (last visited Aug. 14, 2003) (reporting that, since the 
popular pay-per-song ITunes service was launched in April 2003, ‘‘a stampede of companies is 
following Apple Computer pell-mell into the online music sales business’’); John Borland, 
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group supports use licenses and technology levies as a means to 
compensate artists while threatening the hegemony of traditional 
publishers.18 And finally, a vocal group of content providers contends 
that our incentive-based copyright system can function in a digital 
environment if --    and only if --    Congress mandates the inclusion of 
standardized, digitized enforcement tools in every technology that plays a 
role in making and sending copies.19 
All but one of these views reflects a fundamental rethinking of the 
role of copyright in our society. The first view effectively dismisses --    as 
outdated or, perhaps, ill-conceived --    the Constitutional aspiration  of 
using exclusive rights to spur creative endeavor.20 The last two proposals, 
though radically different from one another, share an important common 
feature: each would replace our current law, which centers on copyright 
owners and those who actually use their works, with one that sweeps a 
much broader array of characters into the legal arena. The levy model 
would replace the current market-based approach to intellectual property 
licensing with a government-imposed royalty system and, under some 
proposals, would tax a wide range of products and services to support 
creative artists.21 And the Hollings scheme would burden an assortment 
of related industries with responsibility for policing publishers’ 
copyrights.22 
This Article critically evaluates a core assumption that underlies 





Europeans to Get Windows Music Store, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 13, 2003, available at 
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5063595.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2003) (noting new pay- 
per-song service that Microsoft is launching in Europe); John Borland, Sony to Launch Net 
Music Service, CNET NEWS.COM, Sept. 4, 2003, at http://news.com.com/2100-1027- 
5071475.html (reporting Sony announcement of its impending launch of an ‘‘in-house digital 
music service’’ that ‘‘will see its music, move and electronics divisions work closely together’’). 
18. E.g., Netanel, supra note 15; Lessig, supra note 1 (advocating compulsory license for 
distribution of works online, in which ‘‘businesses that make or facilitate the distribution of 
unprotected copyright content should have the right to use that content so long as they pay a 
relatively low, fixed rate’’). 
19. E.g., Hearing on Protecting Content in a Digital Age----Promoting Broadband and 
the Digital Television Transition: Full Committee Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on 
Commerce, Science & Transportation, 107th Cong. 2-3 (2002) [hereinafter Hearing on 
Protecting Content in a Digital Age] (testimony of Michael D. Eisner, Chairman & CEO, 
The  Walt  Disney  Company)  (proposing  legal  requirement  that  common  technological 
standards ‘‘be mandated for inclusion in all digital media devices that handle creative content’’); 
Hearing on Protecting Content in a Digital Age (testimony of Jack Valenti, President & 
CEO, The Motion Picture Association of America). 
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
21. E.g., Netanel, supra note 15. 
22. Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, S. 2048, 107th Cong. 
(introduced Mar. 21, 2002). 
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cannot, or should not,23 be addressed through application or moderate 
adjustment of the common law of copyright.24 Under existing law, only 
those who actually engage in acts of reproduction or distribution --    and 
those controlling or working closely with them --    are accountable to the 
copyright holder. While doctrines of contributory and vicarious liability 
have long existed, courts have hesitated to invoke them against parties or 
technologies whose primary activities are non-infringing. And they have 
hesitated for good reasons, some principled and others practical. Before 
shifting from this acts-based, individualized scheme to one that falls back 
on neutral technology as either a tax base or an enforcer, we should have 
confidence that the current system does not work and cannot be fixed. 
Part I describes, in historical context, the common law approach to 
copyright infringement and secondary liability. It explains the careful 
balance between inducement and restraint reflected in pre-digital 
copyright law, and explores the features of pre-digital information 
markets that made it possible to preserve economic incentives in such 
markets despite fairly circumscribed standards of vicarious and 
contributory infringement. It continues by identifying the challenges of 
first-generation consumer copying technologies and to explain why the 
Supreme Court refused to give copyright holders leverage over these 
products. This Part concludes that, despite some shifts in the economics 
of information markets in the early twentieth century, the nature of pre- 
digital copying and distribution technologies made it possible to achieve 
the inducement objectives of copyright law while limiting liability to a 
tight circle of direct infringers and their associates. 
Part II considers the claim that the changes introduced by digital 




23. The Hollings scheme reflects a sense that current copyright laws cannot contain 
infringement on file-sharing networks, and that Congress should revamp the laws in order to 
bring the situation back into control. Neil Netanel and other advocates of a copyright levy, in 
contrast, believe that the file-sharing revolution presents important opportunities to 
revolutionize the production and distribution of copyrighted works; they view their proposed 
reallocation, not as an attempt to restore the prior order, but to impose a new order that 
preserves incentives while freeing all kinds of new uses of copyrighted works. See Netanel, 
supra note 15, at 16 (suggesting that levy scheme might be preferable to enforcement of 
exclusive rights in the file swapping context, given the ‘‘wide ranging and partly overlapping 
costs’’ of exclusive rights, including costs due to ‘‘deadweight loss, . . . licensing and 
enforcement, . . . DRM development and implementation, . . . impeded consumer economics 
and P2P network innovation and capacity, . . . ISP and other third party overdeterrence, . . . 
impairment of personal privacy, suppression of P2P users’ speech and creativity, and the 
conflict between law and social norm’’). 
24. By ‘‘common law of copyright,’’ I refer to the iterative, incremental process through 
which United States copyright has historically evolved. I use common law loosely to include 
statutory amendments that either codify existing case law, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2002) (fair 
use), or otherwise fit this traditional mold. 
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the digital revolution into three stages: digital storage, early generation 
Internet distribution, and peer-to-peer file-sharing. While the first two 
stages presented some initial challenges, I suggest that the continued 
existence of some level of centralization in the distribution process made 
it possible for copyright holders to use existing legal tools to preserve 
their essential markets. The real challenge, this Part contends, lies in the 
most recent phase, peer-to-peer file-sharing, which, with its 
decentralizated distribution, makes it more difficult to stem infringement 
by focusing on a central set of actors. A number of commentators have 
argued that this change justifies a fundamental restructuring  of 
copyright, and this Part examines some of these proposals. Given the 
flaws in these proposals, this Part concludes that we should not turn to 
them without full confidence that copyright holders cannot preserve 
meaningful economic markets using existing legal tools. 
Part III considers whether the copyright system is indeed broken -- 
whether existing tools of copyright law are incapable of serving the law’s 
essential utilitarian goals.25 My goal is not so much to answer this 
question as to open it for critical debate. It strikes me that neither 
copyright holders nor the advocates of a levy have yet made the case for a 
wholesale restructuring of copyright law, because copyright holders have 
only recently begun using the tool that has served them well historically: 
the direct infringement suit. In the summer of 2003, the Recording 
Industry Association of America began a new strategy of identifying and 
suing individuals engaged in unauthorized file-sharing. While the long- 
term effect of this strategy has yet to be seen, logic suggests that this 
renewed focus on primary infringers --    i.e., those who actually copy and 
benefit from copyrighted works --    may well deter enough unauthorized 
file-sharing to stanch the current flood of infringement, without turning 






25. Existing tools include not only traditional contributory and vicarious liability claims, 
but also the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.  See 17 
U.S.C. § 1201. That said, most scholars accept that most locks can be cracked, so that even 
encrypted content will inevitably be available for distribution through file-sharing networks 
absent ubiquitous technology such as watermark identifying technology.   See, e.g., Note, 
Exploitative Publishers, Untrustworthy Systems, and the Dream of a Digital Revolution for 
Artists, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2438, 2456 (2001) (‘‘Recent history suggests . . . that [self-help] 
copy protections will be routinely cracked, and the countertechnologies that defeat encryption 
may well proliferate as easily as computer users exchange copyrighted works on the Internet ---- 
and  through  the  same  channels.’’)  (footnotes  omitted);  Timothy  L.  Skelton,  Internet 
Copyright Infringement and Service Providers: The Case for a Negotiated Rulemaking 
Alternative, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 219, 219 (1998) (‘‘Pirated copies of computer software 
and ‘cracker’ utilities used to defeat copy-protection schemes are widely available.’’). 
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I. ALLOCATING BURDENS: THE COMMON LAW 
 
For most of its history, copyright law in the United States centered 
on the enforcement of exclusive rights against direct infringers.26 None 
of the copyright statutes clearly defined liability against those who merely 
facilitated --    rather than committing --    an act reserved to the copyright 
holder.27 And while doctrines of vicarious28 and contributory29 liability 
emerged in the common law, courts invoked them primarily in cases 
involving agency relationships or commercial enterprises whose business 
included promoting infringement.30 
This historical focus on direct infringement follows from the 
Constitutional  objective  of  copyright  and  the  nature  of  traditional 
 
 
26. The focus on exclusive rights follows from the Constitution, which empowers 
Congress ‘‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their . . . Writings. . . .’’ U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
Because the Copyright Act defines direct infringement to include a wide range of activities, 
including not only reproduction but also distribution, public performance and display, and 
creation of derivative works, a potentially broad cast of characters can qualify as direct 
infringers. Nonetheless, each of these characters is defined by some use that they have 
personally made of the copyrighted work. 
27. The Copyright Act of 1976 contains only a vague reference to indirect infringement. 
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002) (granting copyright owners ‘‘the exclusive rights to do and to 
authorize’’ a series of acts with the copyrighted work); see also Sony, 464 U.S. 417, 435 & n.17 
(1985) (noting lack of clarity in standards of secondary copyright liability, and speculating that 
such muddiness ‘‘may, in part, be attributable to the fact that an infringer is not merely one 
who uses a work without authorization by the copyright owner, but also one who authorizes 
the use of a copyrighted work without actual authority from the copyright owner’’). The 1909 
Act limited civil liability to those who ‘‘infringe[d] the copyright’’ of a protected work, but 
provided criminal remedies against anyone who ‘‘knowingly and willfully’’ aided or abetted 
infringement committed for profit.  Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104, repealed 
by Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. 
28. Vicarious liability requires a right and ability to supervise infringing activity coupled 
with a direct financial benefit deriving from the infringement. See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. 
Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971). 
29. See Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162 (holding that ‘‘one who, with knowledge of the 
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct  of 
another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer’’) (footnotes omitted). 
30. In Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911), for example, a film producer 
distributed an unauthorized dramatization of Ben Hur to exhibitors who committed infringing 
public performances. The Supreme Court upheld liability against the producer when such 
infringement ‘‘was the most conspicuous purpose for which they could be used, and the one for 
which especially they were made.’’ Id. at 63. See also Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green 
Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308-09 (2d Cir. 1963) (finding department store liable for infringing sales 
by concessionaire based partly on agency theory); Gershwin, 443 F.2d at 1162-63 (imposing 
liability against organization that knowingly created audience for infringing performances). 
See generally Stacey L. Dogan, Infringement Once Removed: The Perils of Hyperlinking to 
Infringing  Content,  87  IOWA  L.  REV. 829,  897  (2002)  (suggesting  that,  ‘‘as  originally 
conceived, vicarious infringement represented an extension of principal/agent  liability,  in 
which a party faced legal responsibility for acts that occurred under her supervision and were 
carried out on her behalf’’). 
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markets for creative expression. The Constitution contemplates a 
copyright system in which the promise of exclusive economic rights 
drives creative authorship.31 Absent such rights, the argument goes, 
market failure would occur because authors, unable to recapture their 
investments in creative works, would turn to other endeavors. By 
granting authors legal control over uses of their expression, copyright law 
enables licensing, which ensures the distribution of works to audiences 
that value them, while at the same time conferring at least some of the 
proceeds to authors.32 This utilitarian scheme has shaped both legislative 
and judicial developments in copyright law, generally with expansionist 
effect. As new markets for creative expression have emerged, Congress 
and the courts have reserved them to copyright holders, reasoning that 
authors will thus have an incentive to realize the full economic value of 
their works.33 
Against this background, the law’s historical focus on direct 
infringement made sense because the primary economic markets for 
creative expression involved public, identifiable transactions between 
providers and consumers of copyrighted works. Providers made works 
available to the public in copies or through some performance or display, 
and because none of these tasks was costless, few engaged in them in any 




31. See U.S. CONST., supra  note 26. 
32. Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner’s Dilemma in 
Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 854 (1992) (explaining market failure 
theory of copyright law). But see Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of 
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970) 
(contending that the first-to-market advantage provides sufficient economic incentive for 
publishers to fund and publish literary works). 
33. See Eldred  v.  Ashcroft,  123  S.  Ct.  769,  786  (2003)  (upholding  copyright  term 
extension, to life plus seventy years, as rational Congressional decision to ‘‘promote . . . 
Progress’’);   PAUL   GOLDSTEIN,   COPYRIGHT’S   HIGHWAY:   FROM   GUTENBERG   TO   THE 
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 236 (1994) (advocating allegiance to ‘‘copyright’s historic logic that the 
best prescription for connecting authors to their audiences is to extend rights into every corner 
where  consumers  derive  value  from  literary  and  artistic  works’’);  cf.  Jane  C.  Ginsburg, 
Copyright and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
1613, 1617 (2001) (contending that decisionmakers tend to rebuff copyright holders’ attempts 
to block new formats for content delivery, but ‘‘when copyright holders seek to participate in 
and be paid for the new modes of exploitation, the courts, and Congress, appear  more 
favorable, not only to the proposition that copyright owners should get something for the new 
exploitation, but more importantly, to the proposition that when the new market not merely 
supplements but also rivals prior markets, copyright owners should control that new market’’); 
Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 
42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1285 (2001) (‘‘As new ways of consuming copyrighted 
works, and correspondingly new market structures, arose, copyright law expanded to include 
these new models of consumption.’’). But see Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 342 & n.30 (2002) (enumerating exceptions to copyright holders’ 
exclusive rights to control uses of copyrighted works). 
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books, one needed a printing press, and the mass production and 
distribution of other creative works similarly required physical 
infrastructure of some meaningful size.34 As a result, the task of 
identifying those who actually created and distributed copies presented a 
manageable challenge to copyright holders.35 And while the more 
episodic nature of public performances sometimes made detection more 
difficult, the doctrines of vicarious and contributory infringement 
allowed recourse against dance halls, agents, and other commercial actors 
that profited from cumulative acts of infringement.36 To the extent that 
economic markets existed for creative works, then, copyright holders 
could exploit them by pursuing the parties that profited from use of their 
expression and demanding a license or cessation of the activity.37 And at 
least theoretically, the promise of such markets encouraged the creation 
and dissemination of works of authorship. 
This rough sketch of the incentive side of the copyright equation, of 
course, tells only part of the story. Under the Constitution, the copyright 
incentive exists for a purpose --    to promote knowledge --    and before the 




34. See Lunney, supra note 17, at 823-24 (describing scale and centralization of pre- 
digital copying and distribution activities); Panel III: Implications of Enforcing the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act: A Case Study, Focusing on United States v. Skylarov, 12 
FORDHAM  INTELL.  PROP.  MEDIA  &  ENT.  L.J.  805,  824  (2002)  (comments  of  Bruce 
Lehman, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and 
Trademarks) (noting that before the digital revolution, ‘‘if you wanted to infringe on 
somebody’s copyright, you had to have some kind of a factory to do so’’). 
35. See Lunney, supra note 17, at 823 (in the age of the printing press, ‘‘the principle of 
controlling unauthorized reproduction by direct action against individual infringers was both 
practical and sensible’’); Panel III, supra note 34, at 824 (in the early twentieth century, ‘‘a 
copyright system that enabled you to sue somebody in a civil lawsuit for copyright 
infringement generally meant that you were going to sue someone who was in the large-scale, 
commercial business of copyright infringement’’). 
36. See, e.g., Gershwin Publ’g Co. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 
1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding both contributory and vicarious liability against party that acted 
as agent for infringing performers); Irving Berlin, Inc. v. Daigle, 26 F.2d 149, 150 (E.D. La. 
1928) (‘‘[T]he mere fact that he operated and controlled the place of public entertainment, 
charging admission and so operating for a profit, establishes his liability for permitting and 
authorizing the unlicensed use of plaintiff’s musical compositions in and on the premises.’’), 
aff’d on relevant grounds, rev’d on other grounds, 31 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1929); see also 
Hearing before the Joint Committees on Patents, Cong. (1908) 239-41 (representative of 
theatrical organization advocating criminal liability against parties that advertise and provide 
material for infringing public performances, and contending that ‘‘no matter what the penalty 
is, if it merely attaches itself to the person who is producing or playing this act, it has been very 
difficult for us to get them’’ because the performers ‘‘are moving continually all over the 
country’’). 
37. Tim Wu describes this as the ‘‘gatekeeper’’ feature of copyright law. See Tim Wu, 
When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 685 (2003) (‘‘the copyright regime has achieved 
its goals through enforcement against specialized intermediaries ---- those capable of distributing 
creative works on a massive scale’’). 
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impact on the evolution of copyright law. Fair use,38 first sale,39 
originality,40 and other limiting doctrines helped to ensure that the public 
got the benefit of its bargain with content creators, and  that  future 
authors had tools with which to create.  And because transaction costs 
made it infeasible for all users of copyrighted expression to obtain 
licenses for their use, a certain amount of unauthorized copying 
continued unchecked.41 Copyright, then, offered financial incentives, but 
did not guarantee perfect recovery of the full value of creative works.42 
The existence of centralized publishing and distribution entities made it 
possible to protect the broad contours of copyright holders’ economic 
markets without pursuing every individual that made use of their 
expression. The common law of copyright, in other words, consciously 
accepted some leakage in markets for copyrighted works, but stepped in 




38.   17 U.S.C. § 107. 
39. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a); see also R. Anthony Reese, The First-Sale Doctrine in the Era of 
Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. REV. 577 (2003) (noting the risks to the first sale doctrine that 
may result from the increasingly intangible and ephemeral means of disseminating copyrighted 
works). 
40. See Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (requiring 
some minimal degree of creativity as a prerequisite for copyright protection). 
41. In an influential article, Wendy Gordon contended that many of these incidental 
unauthorized uses should fall within the fair use doctrine. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as 
Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its 
Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1614 (1982) (contending that copyright’s fair use 
doctrine should allow unauthorized uses of copyrighted material when (1) defendant cannot 
purchase use through the market, (2) defendant’s use will serve the public interest, and (3) the 
use would not ‘‘substantially impair[]’’ the copyright owner’s incentives); see also Gordon, 
supra note 32, at 855 (‘‘if a defendant faces market failure in the face of copyright, that is a 
good argument (if not a complete one) for not enforcing the copyright against him, for in his 
case, the economic foundation for copyright has crumbled’’). Courts have applied Gordon’s 
market failure analysis to conclude that, as transaction costs decrease and metering of 
incidental uses  becomes  feasible, some incidental uses should come within  the copyright 
holder’s economic domain.  E.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930-31 
(2d Cir. 1994) (‘‘it is not unsound to conclude that the right to seek payment for a particular 
use tends to become legally cognizable under the fourth fair use factor when the means for 
paying  for  such  a  use  is  made easier’’).    But see Wendy Gordon,  Market Failure and 
Intellectual Property: A Response to Professor Lunney, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1031, 1032-33 
(2002) (pointing out that other forms of market failure commonly occur and justify a finding 
of fair use under the economic model); cf. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: 
Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 977 (2002) (‘‘Properly understood, Sony stands not for 
the proposition that fair use is justified only in those exceptional cases where a licensing 
scheme  or  some  other  market  mechanism  is  impractical.    Rather,  Sony  stands  for  the 
recognition of fair use as a central and vital arbiter between two competing public interests’’ ---- 
the incentive goals of copyright and the public’s interest in access to copyrighted works). 
42. See Sony, 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1985) (noting that copyright ‘‘protection has never 
accorded the copyright owner complete control over all possible uses of his work’’); Dogan, 
supra note 30, at 883-84 (discussing deliberate ‘‘leakage’’ of United States copyright law, and 
collecting authorities). 
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The centralized nature of copying and distribution began to erode 
somewhat in the late 1950s and early 1960s, with the introduction of 
technologies that enabled individuals to reproduce expressive content 
without major capital expenditures. The photocopy machine empowered 
people to duplicate books or articles in a matter of minutes;43 cassette 
recorders facilitated copying of music off the air or from recorded 
sources;44 and the Betamax video recorder made it possible to tape 
television programs in the privacy of individual homes.45 For the first 
time, a significant amount of unauthorized copying was taking place 
outside of any commercial publishing and distribution network. 
The introduction of these new copying technologies  raised 
important questions under copyright law. First, to the extent the new 
machines shifted some copying activities from centralized, commercial 
enterprises to individual end users, the law had to resolve whether such 
activities constituted infringement or fair use.46 Second, assuming that at 
least some parties used the equipment to infringe, it was unclear whether 
the equipment manufacturers should share legal responsibility for that 
behavior. Then, as now, the content industries claimed that if they could 
not capture the value of this atomized, unauthorized copying, they would 
lose the financial incentive to create and publish books, music, and 
audiovisual works. And because the dispersion of copying activities 
made it a daunting task to identify people who reproduced copyrighted 
works, copyright holders sought to capture at least some of this value 




43. See Harvey S. Perlman & Laurens H. Rhinelander, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. 
United States: Photocopying, Copyright, and the Judicial Process, 1975 SUP. CT. REV. 355, 
360-61 (contrasting early copying techniques with new, inexpensive photoduplication 
technologies); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 33, at 79 (discussing introduction of photocopying 
technology). 
44. Consumer devices became viable in the mid-1960s. See David Balaban, Note, The 
Battle of the Music Industry: The Distribution of Audio and Video Works Via the Internet, 
Music and More, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA  & ENT. L.J. 235, 245-46 (2001) 
(describing history of consumer recording devices). 
45. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 417; see also Picker, supra note 3, at 288-291. 
46. Alternatively, some argued that personal copying should enjoy a separate exemption 
from copyright that did not rely on the complex balancing that takes place in fair use analysis. 
For a narrative history of the debate over personal copying, see PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 
COPYRIGHT’S  HIGHWAY  129-64  (1994). 
47. See, e.g., Note, Exploitative Publishers, Untrustworthy Systems, and the Dream of a 
Digital Revolution for Artists, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2438, 2445 (2001) (noting recording 
industry’s panic-stricken reaction to audio cassette technology); Joel L. McKuin, Home Audio 
Taping of Copyrighted Works and the Home Recording Act of 1992: A Critical Analysis, 16 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 311, 320 (1994) (‘‘While scholars, the recording industry and 
electronics manufacturers bickered over whether home copying was fair use, repeated bills were 
introduced in Congress to institute royalties on blank tapes and/or to require equipment 
manufacturers to adopt electronic copy management systems.’’). 
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to theories of contributory and vicarious liability that thus far had served 
as narrow complements to direct infringement claims.48 
Despite years of lobbying49 and litigation50 over these issues, the 
legal status of end-user copying technologies was not resolved until the 
Supreme Court decided Sony v. Universal City Studios in 1984.51    In 
Sony, a group of motion picture copyright owners alleged that Sony had 
committed contributory infringement by selling Betamax video recorders 
with knowledge that consumers would use them to  infringe.52  The 
district court, after a lengthy trial, rejected their claim.  The  Ninth 
Circuit, however, reinstated it, finding that those who recorded television 
programs without authorization were infringing and that Sony had 
knowingly facilitated that infringement.53 The Supreme Court, by a bare 
majority, reversed.54 The Court reasoned, first, that the primary use of 
the Betamax --    so-called time shifting --    constituted fair use.55 The Court 
then borrowed the ‘‘staple article of commerce’’ doctrine of patent law 
and held that, because the Betamax had a ‘‘substantial non-infringing 
use,’’ its manufacture and sale could not be the basis for a suit in 
copyright.56 To hold otherwise, said the Court, would inappropriately 
elevate the copyright holder’s stake in its limited statutory monopoly over 




48. As discussed above, before this wave of equipment cases, contributory and vicarious 
liability was generally imposed only against parties who knowingly committed acts that 
promoted  infringement  or  whose  own  commercial  enterprise  served  as  an  umbrella  for 
infringing behavior. See cases cited supra note 36. 
49. See Perlman & Rhinelander, supra note 43, at 364-66 (outlining legislative efforts to 
resolve legality of unauthorized photocopying); Joseph E. Young, Copyright and the New 
Technologies --- the Case of Library Photocopying, 28  COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 51, 68-69 & 
n.56 (1982) (describing publishers’ efforts to obtain Congressional endorsement of tiered 
pricing and use licenses for libraries that engaged in widespread photocopying). 
50. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 172 U.S.P.Q. 670 (Ct. Cl. 1972) 
(holding most library photocopying to be fair use). 
51.   Sony, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
52. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 432 (C.D. Cal. 
1979). Plaintiffs also made claims for vicarious liability, which the trial rejected and the Ninth 
Circuit did not reinstate. Id. at 461; Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 
F.2d 963, 974-76 (9th Cir. 1982) (reversing on contributory infringement claim only). 
53.    659 F.2d at 974-76. 
54. The questions raised by Sony so perplexed the Court that the majority of justices had 
initially lined up in support of the movie industry. For an entertaining account, see 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 46, at 149-57. 
55. ‘‘Time-shifting’’ is the act of ‘‘recording a program [the consumer] cannot view as it is 
being televised and then watching it once at a later time.’’ Sony, 464 U.S. at 421. The 
Supreme Court found unauthorized time-shifting to be a noninfringing fair use because of its 
noncommercial nature and because the plaintiffs had  not shown harm  to  their  economic 
market as a result of such use. Id. at 447-56. 
56.   Id. at 442. 
57. Id. 
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I have argued elsewhere that Sony’s staple article of commerce 
doctrine, properly interpreted, confines the copyright holder’s economic 
leverage to markets or transactions that owe their existence to 
infringement.58 Contributory infringement claims, in other  words, 
should not lie against parties whose products or services would have 
evolved even in the absence of their infringing applications.59 
Photocopying machines, general purpose computers, and operating 
systems typify technologies that were developed for primarily non- 
infringing objectives. To subject their developers to copyright liability 
merely because they play a facilitating role in infringement would give 
copyright holders control over the design, pricing, and ultimately the 
availability of products that have little to do with their limited legal 




58. Dogan, supra note 12, at 945-46 (interpreting Sony’s primary objective as preventing 
interference by copyright holders in unrelated markets). 
59. Of course, this is not the only plausible reading of Sony, and others have argued that 
Sony proscribes interference with technologies that may have been designed for infringing 
purposes, but whose other, potentially non-infringing purposes have yet to be fully realized.  In 
an insightful article, Mark Lemley and R. Anthony Reese advocate such an approach and 
contend that the recent trend toward broader liability against technology providers will stifle 
innovation. Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Stopping Digital Copyright Infringement 
Without Stopping Innovation (working paper on file with author). See also Brief Amici of 40 
Intellectual Property and Technology Law Professors Supporting Affirmance, Metro- 
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., Nos. 03-55894 & 03-55901, at 6-8 (filed 
Sept. 26, 2003) (offering policy rationales for a standard focused on potential, rather than 
existing, uses); Amended Brief of Amicus Curiae Copyright Law Professors in Support of 
Reversal, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (‘‘The balance 
rests on the side of permitting new technology, not stifling it.’’). Compare Ariel B. Taitz, 
Note, Removing Road Blocks Along the Information Superhighway: Facilitating the 
Dissemination of New Technology by Changing the Law of Contributory Copyright 
Infringement, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 133 (1996) (proposing the imposition of liability on 
makers of technology with ‘‘non-trivial infringing uses’’); cf. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 
334 F.3d 643, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting interpretation of Sony  that focuses on 
potential, rather than actual, use of peer-to-peer technology). While some language in Sony 
supports this interpretation, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 442 (stating that the product ‘‘need merely 
be capable of substantial non-infringing uses’’), the Supreme Court’s focus on non-interference 
with non-infringing markets suggests that liability may be appropriate against makers of 
technologies whose non-infringing applications are insufficient to support their development. 
Because the Court found that the Betamax VCR’s primary use was non-infringing, moreover, 
its  discussion  of  the  requisite  level  of  non-infringing  use  was  dictum.    See  id.  at  423 
(concluding that the combination of authorized and unauthorized time-shifting constituted 
the ‘‘primary use [of the Betamax] for most owners’’). 
60. Copyright law offers the possibility of both monetary and injunctive relief, so that if 
copyright holders could prevail on contributory infringement claims against technology 
developers, they could generally shut down the technology. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 440-42 
(noting importance of staple article of commerce doctrine in both patent and copyright law, 
because while a ‘‘finding of contributory infringement does not, of course, remove the article 
from the market altogether[,] it does . . . give the [intellectual  property  holder]  effective 
control over the sale of that item’’); see generally A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 
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inducement objectives, would deprive individuals of fair use rights, and 
might even be unconstitutional.61 
Despite the dire predictions of the movie industry, moreover, the 
Betamax did not evolve into its ‘‘Boston strangler;’’62 to the contrary, the 
videocassette market became a tremendous revenue generator for the 
movie industry.63 Nor did photocopying machines or cassette recorders 
destroy the book or music publishing industries.64 Each of these content 
sectors managed to survive, despite the increased decentralization of 
copying activities and the narrow standards of liability against those who 
facilitated such copying. Their survival may well have resulted from the 
good will of consumers, who would just as soon buy an original as make 
or obtain a copy from an unauthorized source.65 More likely, however, 
the consumer copying technologies did not displace traditional publishers 
because originals remained superior in quality and easier to obtain, and 
because the new technologies did not alter the fundamentally tangible, 
costly, and public nature of the distribution process. Certainly, some 
copying and sharing went undetected, but such acts required access to an 





F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming injunction against file-sharing provider that required it to 
screen music files after receiving notice from copyright holders). 
The Sony dissenters, as well as the Ninth Circuit, had acknowledged this problem, 
but believed that its solution lay in narrowly tailored relief, rather than denying a cause of 
action against those whose products facilitate infringement. See 464 U.S. at 499 (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting) (‘‘I concur . . . in the Court of Appeals’ suggestion that an award of damages, or 
continuing royalties, or even some form of limited injunction, may well be an appropriate 
means of balancing the equities in this case.’’). 
61. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769, 790 (2003) (finding  First  Amendment 
scrutiny unnecessary when ‘‘Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright 
protection,’’ but suggesting that First Amendment concerns may arise when ‘‘copyright’s built- 
in speech safeguards’’ are disturbed). 
62. See   Hearings   Before   the   Subcomm.   on   Courts,   Civil   Liberties,   and   the 
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 15-168 (1982) 
(testimony of Jack Valenti, President of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., 
contending that ‘‘the VCR is to the American film producer and the American public as the 
Boston strangler is to the woman home alone’’). 
63. See Adam Liptak, Is Litigation the Best Way to Tame New Technology?, N. Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2000, available at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/09/biztech/ 
articles/02napster.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2003) (noting that ‘‘video rental income now rivals 
box-office receipts’’ for the movie industry). 
64. To some extent, these technologies, like the VCR, have opened up new markets for 
copyrighted works.  In the book publishing context, the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) 
facilitates permissions for copying of published works, collects fees, and distributes royalties to 
publishers. See http://www.copyright.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2003); see generally Princeton 
Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1388 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting 
existence of licensing market in evaluating fair use defense). 
65. See Bartow, supra note 17 (suggesting that consumers generally prefer to purchase 
legal copies, if available on reasonable terms). 
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copies, at any meaningful scale, required investment and visibility.66 Just 
as before, copyright holders could avoid infringement floods by focusing 
on tangible, public transactions involving their intellectual property; at 
the same time, individuals could engage in personal, non-commercial use 
of copyrighted works without eliminating core markets for content.67 
The common law model of copyright infringement, post-Sony, thus 
had three key features. First, it preserved the principal economic markets 
for copyrighted works by protecting against market-destroying uses of 
the copyrighted content --    i.e., against infringement floods.68 Second, it 
specifically contemplated some ‘‘leakage’’ into the public of the content 
protected by copyright, allowing individuals to use copyrighted works 
without permission when such use did not substantially displace demand 
for the content.69 And third, the law allowed neutral technology markets 
to mature without interference by content owners. Under the Supreme 
Court’s approach, neither technology developers nor their customers 
should have to endure higher costs or suboptimal products to protect 
third party copyrights.   Sony thus preserved the status of contributory 
and vicarious liability as surgical tools for use against parties closely 
involved in another’s infringement, rather than mechanisms for 
wholesale redistribution of the costs of copyright enforcement. 
 
II. BURDEN ALLOCATION IN A DIGITAL AGE 
 
The combination of digital technology and the Internet 
fundamentally changed the economic model of content dissemination. 
For the first time, individuals could make perfect copies of copyrighted 
content and distribute them globally at almost no cost. Because of the 
intimate relationship between digitization and the Internet, advocates, 




66. See, e.g., RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri, 596 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (action 
against counterfeiters of copyrighted records and tapes). 
67. Copyright holders attempted, but failed, to pass legislation that would reverse the 
result in Sony, either through some levy on copying technologies or through adoption of a 
mandatory copy-protection standard.  Congress thus deliberately rejected, at least at the time, 
a more expansive approach to cost-spreading in copyright law. The one narrow exception 
consisted of a tax on digital audio recording devices, which have largely been superseded by 
more general-use digital copying technologies. See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 46, at 
157-64 (describing legislative efforts). 
68. See Sony, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) (‘‘A challenge to a noncommercial use of a 
copyrighted work requires proof either that the particular use is harmful, or that if it should 
become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.’’). 
69. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 451 (finding fair use when plaintiffs failed to show that 
noncommercial use of their television programs ‘‘would cause any likelihood of nonminimal 
harm to the potential market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works’’). 
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assume that copyright law must address them together, if at all.70 From a 
copyright perspective, however, the digital revolution divides into three 
distinct phases that challenge the existing copyright model in unique 
ways. The first two phases --    digital content storage  and  the  early 
Internet --    altered the technology of reproduction and distribution, but 
arguably preserved enough of the attributes of copyright markets to make 
the copyright balance attainable through application of existing doctrine. 
It is only the most recent development --    file-sharing71 --    that directly 
challenges one of the key assumptions of pre-digital copyright: that by 
focusing on a narrow, visible core of content distributors, copyright 
holders could keep unauthorized use of their expression to a trickle, 
rather than a flood.72 This Part examines these three phases of the 
digital revolution and considers their impact on copyright’s balance. 
Digital technology --    including software, replication and storage 
media, and various hardware formats --    enables individuals to make 
perfect copies of digital files in their possession.73 The high quality of 
these copies could arguably displace some of the demand for publisher- 
authorized versions of creative works.74 Like the consumer copying 
technologies before it, however, digital technology alone did not alter the 
essentially centralized and public nature of large-scale content 




70. The Hollings bill, for example, applies not only to technologies used to distribute 
content, but to ‘‘any hardware or software that (A) reproduces copyrighted works in digital 
form; (B) converts copyrighted works in digital form into a form whereby the images and 
sounds are visible and audible; or (C) retrieves or accesses copyrighted works in digital form 
and transfers or makes available for transfer such works to hardware or software described in 
subparagraph (B).’’  S. 2048, 107th Cong. § 9 (2002), CONG. REC. S2272. 
71. For an explanation of the first well-known file-sharing technology, Napster, see A & 
M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 905-08 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
72. The music industry projected a six percent decline in sales in 2003, following similar 
declines for the three previous years. See Reuters, RIAA: ISPs Should Pay for Music File 
Swapping, CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 18, 2003, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1023- 
981281.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2003).  While the drop likely does not result entirely from 
file-sharing, there is evidence that at least some of the decline has resulted from the file- 
sharing services and other Internet downloads. See Study: CDs May Soon Be as Final as 
Vinyl, CNET NEWS.COM, Sept. 2, 2003, at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5070177.html 
(noting Forrester Research study indicating that ‘‘20 percent of Americans engage in music 
downloading, and half of the downloaders say they are buying fewer CDs’’); cf. John Borland, 
Music Industry: Piracy is Choking Sales, CNET NEWS.COM, Apr. 9, 2003, at 
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-996205.html  (last  visited  Sept.  4,  2003)  (‘‘If  the  drop  in 
music sales is undeniable, the industry’s unwavering attribution of it to the effects of Internet 
piracy remains controversial.’’). 
73. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC 
GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 3 (1999)  (noting low cost  of  production  of digital 
copies of information goods). 
74. Cf. id. at 55 (contending that displacement does not depend on perfect copies). 
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and before the Internet, copies were obtained either through friends and 
associates, from libraries, or through commercial actors who made them 
available for a fee. The personal-type copying might affect content 
markets, but arguably in the form of leaks, rather than floods.75 And 
because the more commercial, depersonalized copying required scale and 
some level of public exposure,  copyright  holders  could  identify  and 
pursue  those  who  attempted  it.76       Digital  copying  therefore  did  not 
necessarily threaten the core balance struck by the Supreme Court in 
Sony. 
Digital copying raised sufficient concern, however, to prompt 
Congress to pass the 1992 Audio Home Recording Act (‘‘AHRA’’). The 
AHRA required all digital audio recording devices to include a standard 
copy-protection technology that allowed only first-generation copies.77 
It also imposed a statutory royalty on such devices and on blank 
recording media used in such devices, with the proceeds to be distributed 
to copyright holders.78    Congress thus showed itself willing to accept a 
 
 
75. Several factors support this view. First, because the acts of locating, obtaining, and 
copying physical versions of digital files require considerable effort and time, individuals might 
find it more attractive to purchase content through authorized channels. Second, people may 
willingly pay more for content if they know that they can make perfect copies and share them 
with family and friends. The resulting outward shift in the demand curve may make it 
possible for content providers to recover equal or greater profits from the distribution of digital 
works. (Thanks to Judge Williams for making this point at the Silicon Flatirons Symposium.) 
Third, many of those who make private copies do not value the work enough to purchase a 
copy at market prices, so the copyright owner has not lost a sale as a result of such copying. 
76. E.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Wings Digital Corp., 218 F. Supp. 2d 280, 282 
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (suit involving claims of direct, contributory and vicarious infringement 
against parties ‘‘in the business of mastering and manufacturing audio compact discs, 
replicating compact discs and performing other services related to replication’’). The lower 
costs associated with digital copying lowered the barriers to these commercial actors’ entry into 
the music sales market, but did not alter the essentially public nature of their sales activities. 
See John Borland, RIAA Targets Small Stores’ CD Copying, CNET NEWS.COM, Dec. 16, 
2002, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-978096.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2003) 
(describing music industry anti-piracy initiative against small retailers, including convenience 
stores and gas stations, that were allegedly selling counterfeit music CDs). The software 
industry has had notable success in rooting out this type of market-threatening copying and 
distribution behavior.   See, e.g., Dan Goodin, Microsoft Sues Resellers, CNET NEWS.COM, 
Jan. 28, 1998, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1001-207573.html?tag=rn (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2003) (describing action against resellers who were selling unlicensed versions of 
Microsoft software). 
77. 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a). The AHRA limits itself to digital audio tapes and digital audio 
recorders. See id. § 1001(a) (defining ‘‘digital audio recording device’’ as a device ‘‘the digital 
recording function of which is designed or marketed for the primary purpose of, and that is 
capable of, making a digital audio copied recording for private use’’); Recording Indus. Ass’n of 
Am., Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
definition of digital audio recording device does not include computers, whose ‘‘primary 
purpose’’ is not to make digital audio copies). 
78. 17  U.S.C.  §§  1003-007.    The  statute  sets  forth  a  procedure  for  distribution  of 
royalties  to  individuals  and  collective  organizations,  which  the  Librarian  of  Congress 
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compromise --    allowing copyright holders some economic rights over 
technology markets --    but only over a limited market with a clear 
relationship   to   copyrighted   content.79 Digital audio recording 
equipment, moreover, affected only the mechanism for copying, and left 
the dissemination variable unchanged. In any event, because computers 
have largely supplanted digital audio recording devices as the preferred 
medium for recording music, the AHRA has little economic 
significance.80 
The most significant challenge to the copyright balance came with 
the advent of Internet-based content distribution. On the Internet, 
individuals could, for the first time, make digital works available cheaply 
and anonymously to millions of strangers around the world. No longer 
did distribution rely on infrastructure or on access to a physical copy of a 
work. The transaction costs associated with disseminating digital copies 
largely disappeared: to obtain a copy of a work, individuals needed only 
to find someone, somewhere in the world, who had made the material 
available on the Internet.81 
From a copyright enforcement perspective, this change in 
distribution had three primary effects: first, it made it harder to identify 
individuals who disseminated copyrighted expression; second, it 
dramatically increased the number of such people; and third, it exploded 
the number of their recipients. Copyright holders could  no  longer 
capture their core markets by focusing on a tight circle of publishers who 
disseminated their works, nor could they take comfort in the knowledge 
that individual acts of sharing would have little market-destroying effect. 





administers. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1106-07; see also John R. Kettle III, Dancing to the Beat of a 
Different Drummer: Global Harmonization --- and the Need for Congress to Get in Step with 
a Full Public Performance Right for Sound Recordings, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1041, 1068-69 (describing royalty administration system). 
79. Indeed, the restrictive scope of the AHRA has made it virtually irrelevant to the 
current environment, in which computers have replaced digital audiotapes as the recording 
medium of choice. See Brian Leubitz, Note: Digital Millennium? Technological Protections 
for Copyright on the Internet, 11 TEX. INTEL. PROP. L.J. 417, 432 (2003) (describing 
AHRA as ‘‘relatively unimportant and unsuccessful’’). 
80. See, e.g., Copyright Office, 2002 Annual Report of the Register of Copyrights 56 
(reporting only $1.3 million in AHRA royalty fees for calendar year 2001, for distribution 
among all copyright holders). 
81. See Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of 
Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1255 (2001) (‘‘Copies of copyrighted 
works can now be distributed in digital form, without the exchange of any physical object, 
without any title in physical property changing hands, and all indications suggest that this will 
only increase over time, as computer network capacities increase and compression technologies 
improve.’’). 
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end users with little resources or infrastructure could, for the first time, 
threaten market-destroying floods. 
Notwithstanding their scale and relative decentralization, however, 
the first generation of Internet distribution models left copyright holders 
an alternative core on which to focus: the bulletin board service (BBS), 
Internet service provider (ISP), or host computers through which end 
users posted and located infringing content. Copyright holders turned 
their attention, in other words, toward the entities that facilitated the 
distribution of infringing content on the Internet, leaving alone (for the 
time being) the neutral copying technologies at the Internet’s extremities. 
And they did so, at least at first, using the same contributory and 
vicarious liability theories that had failed them in Sony. 
In contrast to their failures in cases like Sony in the 1980s, the 
content owners’ legal strategies against Internet intermediaries largely 
succeeded. Despite some initial uncertainty, the case law in the mid- 
1990s showed a growing trend toward imposing liability when Internet 
intermediaries became aware of a specific act of infringement and did 
nothing to stop it.82 In 1998, moreover, Congress passed the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act, which provided immunity, under copyright, 






82. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 
F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that Internet service provider that refuses to remove 
infringing content after receiving adequate notice of its infringing nature may be liable for 
contributory infringement); Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 687 (N.D. 
Cal. 1994)  (finding bulletin board service liable for contributory  and vicarious copyright 
infringement, when its operators encouraged posting and download of infringing files); Sega 
Enters. v. Sabella, No. 93 Civ. 4260, 1996 WL 780560 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (same); see also 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1169-70 (C.D. Cal. 2002) 
(finding likelihood of success in contributory infringement claim against business that ‘‘markets 
the [infringing site’s] brand through advertising, . . . pays webmasters commissions directly 
based upon the number of [infringing site’s] users that register through the site, . . . provides 
technical and content advice, . . . reviews sites, and . . . attempts to control the quality of the 
‘product’ it presents to consumers as a unified brand’’). 
While  some  early  cases  found  ISPs  liable  for  direct  infringement,  e.g.,  Playboy 
Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 
857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994)), all of the decisions after Netcom focused on contributory 
and vicarious liability, agreeing with the Netcom court that direct liability should require some 
volitional act by the alleged infringer that is absent when copies are made automatically by an 
ISP’s server.   See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 1369 (direct infringement is inappropriate 
because ‘‘designing or implementing a system that automatically and uniformly creates 
temporary copies of all data sent through it is not unlike that of the owner of a copying 
machine  who  lets  the  public  make  copies  with  it’’).    Indeed,  even  the  MAPHIA court 
subsequently ‘‘clarified’’ its holding to conform to Netcom, agreeing that direct infringement 
required some element of volition.   See Sega Enters., Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 
932 (N.D. Cal. 1996)). 
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content posted by their users83 and that adopted policies to terminate 
repeat infringers.84 While these tools certainly did not guarantee leak- 
proof markets, they went a long way toward preventing a flood of 
infringement in the early years of the Internet. 
The combination of judicial action and the DMCA safe harbors 
arguably preserved the three core objectives of the infringement doctrine 
after Sony. First, the law empowered copyright holders to protect the 
broad contours of markets for their works by targeting and blocking 
public transactions in their copyrighted expression.   Second, the law 
ensured at least the possibility that end users could continue to engage in 
fair uses of copyrighted works.85 And finally, both the case law and the 
statute protected the basic, neutral end-to-end technology of the Internet 
against interference by copyright holders. The law’s surgical focus on 
specific instances of infringing postings protected ‘‘the rights of others’’ -- 
i.e.,  the  non-infringing  public  --       ‘‘freely  to  engage  in  substantially 
unrelated areas of commerce.’’86 
No sooner did the dust settle on the first round of legal battles, 
however, than the next generation of Internet distribution models arose: 
end-to-end file-sharing.87 File-sharing technologies such as Napster, 
Gnutella, and KaZaA further decentralized and revolutionized Internet 
 
 
83. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (providing limited immunity to service providers ‘‘for 
infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that 
resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider’’). 
84. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i). Qualifying ISPs must also ‘‘accommodate[]’’ and not 
‘‘interfere with standard technical measures’’ used by copyright holders to identify or protect 
copyrighted works. Id. 
85. The Netcom court held that an ISP could avoid liability if it could show a good faith 
belief that a user’s allegedly infringing behavior was protected under the fair use doctrine. 
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1374 (‘‘Where a BBS operator cannot reasonably verify a claim of 
infringement, either because of a possible fair use defense, the lack of copyright notices on the 
copies, or the copyright holder’s failure to provide the necessary documentation to show that 
there is a likely infringement, the operator’s lack of knowledge will be found reasonable and 
there will be no liability for contributory infringement for allowing the continued distribution 
of the works on its system.’’). Under the DMCA, after an online service provider receives 
notice of alleged infringement by one of its subscribers, the subscriber has the opportunity to 
respond  by  filing  a  counternotification  and  ‘‘put  back’’  demand.    17  U.S.C.  §  512(g). 
Following such a counternotification, the service provider must reinstate the material unless 
the copyright holder files a court action against the subscriber. Id. 
86.   Sony, 464 U.S. 417, 441-42 (1984); see generally Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1377-78 
(noting that First Amendment concerns would arise ‘‘[i]f Usenet servers were responsible for 
screening all messages coming through their systems,’’ but finding such concerns alleviated 
when ‘‘absent evidence of knowledge and participation or control and direct profit, [ISPs] will 
not be contributorily or vicariously liable’’). 
87. The popular and academic interest in file-sharing services has spawned a wealth of 
literature on the subject. For a particularly helpful introduction, see Tim Wu, When Code 
Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679 (2003); see also Michael Slusarz, Designing Networks to 
Avoid Liability: Copyright Infringement for the Second Generation of Peer-to-Peer Software 
(draft on file with author). 
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distribution. Whereas previous Internet distribution occurred either 
through directed communications to known recipients (such as email) or 
through some centralized mechanism for posting and downloading 
information (such as bulletin board services or websites stored on central 
servers), file-sharing services enabled users to identify and acquire files 
held by strangers, without relying on static Internet postings or 
processing by central servers.88 As Judge Posner described it, ‘‘In 
principle, therefore, the purchase of a single CD could be levered into 
the distribution within days or even hours of millions of identical, near- 
perfect . . . copies of the music recorded on the CD --    hence the 
recording industry’s anxiety about file-sharing services oriented toward 
consumers of popular music.’’89 And while the first wave of file-sharing 
services relied on centralized servers to provide directories of currently 
available files,90 later generations are maintained and circulated by a 
network of anonymous individuals around the world.91 
The increasing decentralization of file-sharing services has  both 
legal and practical implications for copyright holders. Legally, the 
decentralization arguably weakens copyright claims against the 
‘‘intermediaries’’ that facilitate peer-to-peer infringement --    in this case, 
the distributors of file-sharing software. Napster, the first widely used 
file-sharing program, found itself vulnerable to contributory  and 
vicarious liability claims largely because it kept a centralized index that, 
among other things, enabled it to identify and remove infringing music 




88. The distinguishing feature of file-sharing services is that they enable users to 
exchange files directly, without passing through some centralized server. Judge Posner 
describes their function as ‘‘similar to that of a stock exchange, which is a facility for matching 
offers rather than a repository of the things being exchanged (shares of stock). But unlike 
transactions on a stock exchange, the consummated ‘transaction’ in music files does not take 
place in [a] facility’’ maintained by the file-sharing service. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 
334 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003). 
89.   Id. at 646. 
90. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that centralized directory made it possible for Napster to block trading of infringing 
files identified by music copyright owners). 
91. See Joseph A. Sifferd, Note, The Peer-to-Peer Revolution: A Post-Napster Analysis 
of the Rapidly Developing File-Sharing Technology, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 92, 107 
(2002) (noting that judicial decisions against developers of file-sharing software ‘‘will not stop 
the pure peer-to-peer networks already in existence’’). 
92. The index, and the resulting ability of Napster to purge infringing files identified by 
the music industry, were critical to the court’s resolution of both the contributory and vicarious 
liability claims. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022 (upholding finding of contributory 
infringement, when ‘‘[t]he record supports the district court’s finding that Napster has actual 
knowledge that specific infringing material is available using its system, that it could block 
access to the system by suppliers of the infringing material, and that it failed to remove the 
material’’); id. at 1024 (finding that Napster had the right and ability to police its users’ 
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eschews such indices, and its providers play little ongoing role in 
facilitating transactions between users.93 At least one district court has 
found that, in the absence of such ongoing, interactive relationships with 
their users, providers of the Grokster and KaZaA file-sharing software 
are immune from copyright suits under Sony.94 And while the Seventh 
Circuit upheld an injunction against a file-sharing service in the Aimster 
case, the defendants there, as in Napster, offered more than a standalone 
software project: their servers continually facilitated searches and file- 
swapping transactions by their users.95 
Even if the law could technically reach distributors of decentralized 
peer-to-peer software, however, a litigation strategy focused solely on the 




infringement, as required for vicarious liability, because of its ‘‘ability to locate infringing 
material listed on its search indices, and the right to terminate users’ access to the system’’). 
93. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp.2d 1029, 
1036-46 (C.D. Cal. 2003); see also Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 103, 108 
(2003) (‘‘While eliminating intermediaries presents a serious technical challenge, the goal is 
clear ---- to remove the enforcement efficiency of a gatekeeper system, leaving primary 
enforcement against end-users as the only option.’’). 
94. Grokster, 259 F. Supp.2d at 1041 (finding no contributory infringement by providers 
of file-sharing software that played no continuing role in facilitating exchange of files between 
users: ‘‘In contrast, Napster indexed the files contained on each user’s computer, and each and 
every search request passed through Napster’s servers.’’); id. at 1045 (rejecting vicarious liability 
claim because ‘‘unlike in Napster, there is no admissible evidence before the Court indicating 
that Defendants have the ability to supervise and control the infringing conduct (all of which 
occurs after the product has passed to end-users’’). 
95. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 651-52. (7th Cir. 2003). Judge 
Posner’s opinion took issue with the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Sony, finding that the 
Napster court improperly ‘‘suggest[ed] that actual knowledge of specific infringing uses is a 
sufficient condition for deeming a facilitator a contributory infringer.’’ Id. at 649 (quoting 2 
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 6.1.2, p. 6:12-1 (2d ed. 2003)). Despite this apparent 
rekindling of Sony, however, the Seventh Circuit went on to suggest that even technologies 
with substantial non-infringing applications might require redesign, if their infringing 
applications are substantial.  See id. at 653 (‘‘Even when there are noninfringing uses of an 
Internet file-sharing service, . . . if the infringing uses are substantial then to avoid liability as a 
contributory infringer the provider of the service must show that it would have been 
disproportionately costly for him to eliminate or at least reduce substantially the infringing 
uses.’’); see also id. at 651-52 (rejecting interpretation of Sony focused on potential, rather than 
actual, non-infringing applications). 
96. Compare Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022 (affirming contributory infringement ruling 
against Napster based on finding that ‘‘Napster has actual knowledge that specific infringing 
material is available using its system, that it could block access to the system by suppliers of the 
infringing material, and that it failed to remove the material’’), and id. at 1024 (finding 
vicarious liability appropriate when Napster had ‘‘the ability to locate infringing material listed 
on its search indices, and the right to terminate users’ access to the system’’), with Grokster, 
259 F. Supp.2d at 1037 (refusing to impose contributory liability against provider of software 
that enabled, but did not centrally control, file-sharing network, because ‘‘in order to be liable 
under a theory of contributory infringement, [defendants] must have actual knowledge of 
infringement at a time when they can use that knowledge to stop the particular infringement’’); 
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truly decentralized peer-to-peer software does not rely on the continued 
operation of any centralized server, it is difficult to recapture after being 
released to the public. Each generation of file-sharing software, 
moreover, poses unique legal challenges that take time to resolve. Given 
the mismatch between the speed of technology and the pace of litigation, 
it seems  unlikely that copyright holders  will rein  in the  file-sharing 
phenomenon through legal efforts aimed at the software.97 
The law could respond in a number of ways. For one thing, 
policymakers could opt for copyright abandonment, concluding that 
copyright serves little function in a digital environment.98 A number of 
scholars have proposed abandonment, particularly in industries such as 
music, where artists frequently get a scant share of the proceeds from the 
sale of copies of their works.99 While a full critique of this option is 
beyond the scope of this Article, abandonment is unlikely to preserve 
incentives in content industries requiring sustained  investment;100 
perhaps more significantly, it eliminates the possibility that artists could, 
 
 
id. at 1045  (finding no vicarious liability when defendants ‘‘provide software that 
communicates across networks that are entirely outside Defendants’ control’’). 
97. See id.; see also Anna Wilde Mathews & Charles Goldsmith, A Global Journal 
Report: Music Industry Faces New Threats on the Web,  WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2003, at B1 
(noting that peer-to-peer networks are increasingly locating in jurisdictions where their 
behavior will escape copyright scrutiny).  As Glynn Lunney points out, the steady growth of 
bandwidth will only exacerbate the increasing rift between file-sharing technology and legal 
efforts to stop it. See Lunney, supra note 17, at 825-26 (contending that, with the increased 
dispersion of copying technology, together with bandwidth expansion and lower costs 
associated with copying and distribution, ‘‘unauthorized sharing between private individuals 
through the Internet, which today is a relatively minor problem reaching only musical works, 
sound recordings, and certain computer programs, threatens to become a serious problem for 
digital works of authorship more generally’’). 
98. Netanel calls this option ‘‘digital abandon.’’ See Netanel, supra note 15, at 55-57. 
99. See, e.g., Ku, supra note 16 
100. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE 
L.J. 283, 288-89 (1996) (arguing that ‘‘‘sustained works of authorship’ ---- books, articles, films, 
songs, and paintings ---- form a central part of democratic discourse, and that a robust copyright 
is a necessary (though not necessarily sufficient) condition both for the creation and 
dissemination of that expression and for its independent and pluralist character’’). Even if it 
does not ultimately reduce incentives to create such works, abandonment may have the effect 
of deterring copyright holders from making them available in new formats. See Jane C. 
Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the Information Superhighway: Authors, Exploiters and Copyright 
in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1499 (1995) (contending that ‘‘[t]he viability of 
cyberspace as a medium for the consensual communication and creation of sustained works of 
authorship ---- real ‘cars,’ not simply conversations, data of the day, or pirated postings ---- will 
depend on authors’ and copyright owners’ confidence’’ that online copyright issues ‘‘will find 
solutions that will meet the needs of both authors and users’’); Graeme W. Austin, Does the 
Copyright Clause Mandate Isolationism?, 26 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 17, 46 & n. 196 (2002); 
see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright within the First Amendment Skein, 54 
STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001) (lauding copyright’s ‘‘structural effect’’ of ‘‘subsidizing a robust speech 
sector, consisting of authors, publishers, and media enterprises that need not rely on 
potentially censorial government subsidies in order to be heard’’). 
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someday, profit from distribution through platforms that give them a 
more equitable share of the value of their works.101 
Even those who believe in the continued relevance of copyright, 
however, differ on how to achieve copyright’s goals in the current 
technological environment. While competing proposals divide on a 
number of different axes, one area of disagreement strikes me as 
fundamental: whether the current technological environment justifies a 
shift away from the direct infringement model and toward one that 
reallocates copyright’s burdens among a broader class of individuals and 
technologies. The reallocation proposals differ in motivation and effect, 
but share a common skepticism about the suitability of common law 
tools for preserving copyright’s balance in the digital age. 
The first reallocation scheme appears in Senator Hollings’ proposed 
Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act.102 The 
Hollings legislation seeks to speed the growth of broadband by assuring 
secure delivery of digital content. Absent a standard security technology 
to protect content, the argument goes, copyright holders will not make 
their most valuable works available on-line, and consumers will 
accordingly have little need for greater bandwidth. The solution, in 
Senator Hollings’ view, is to mandate that standard security technology 
appear in virtually every new computer-related product.103 
The Hollings bill would transform the burden allocation that 
characterized copyright law under Sony. Whereas previously, the law 






101. See  Jane  C.  Ginsburg,  Copyright  and  Control  over  New  Technologies  of 
Dissemination,  101  COLUM.  L.  REV. 1613,  1646-47  (2001)  (‘‘The  more  self-publication 
offers realistic prospects of remuneration for authors, the more likely we are to see an increase 
in the volume and diversity of works of authorship, as authors will be able to bypass the 
gatekeeping functions of publishers and other intermediaries.’’). 
102.    S. 2048, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002). 
103. The bill would require every ‘‘digital media device’’ distributed in the United States to 
include standard security technology to protect against the unauthorized use of copyrighted 
works. Id. §§ 3, 5. ‘‘Digital media devices’’ include any hardware or software that retrieves, 
transfers, converts, or reproduces copyrighted content. Id. § 9. The standard security 
technology would be decided by participating industry groups or, barring their consensus, by 
the Federal Communications Commission. Id. § 3. Theoretically, this system would protect 
against infringing file-sharing, because content files would travel with watermarks or other 
code that set limits on their use, and end users’ computers would identify and honor that code. 
Realistically, even this rigorous security system would be vulnerable to hackers who would 
remove the code and redistribute the underlying content. See Netanel, supra note 15 (noting 
vulnerability of security technologies); see also Jim Hu, Hollywood Sets Stage for Piracy Battle 
with PC Industry, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 7, 2002, available at http://news.com.com/2009- 
1023-9468672.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2003) (‘‘Even if encryption technologies are required 
by law, their endurance remains an open question.’’). 
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their close associates,104 the Hollings model would charge the entire 
high-technology community with an affirmative responsibility to prevent 
unauthorized use of copyrighted material.105 It would arrest technology 
by imposing a uniform government standard.106 It would burden all 
consumers with the inevitable loss of speed and efficiency that the 
mandated technology would entail.107 Depending on which security 
measures were ultimately adopted, moreover, the new law could threaten 
fair use rights and put the government imprimatur on copy-protection 
technology designed to prevent leaks, rather than floods.108 Essentially, 
the Hollings proposal would fortify copyright holders’ arsenal at the 
expense of technology and technology users.   Rather than the surgical 
approach called for by Sony, it would opt for a bludgeon. 
 
 
104. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act modified this  model  somewhat  by 
prohibiting the use or distribution of tools that could circumvent copy protection schemes. 
The DMCA, however, consciously avoided imposing any obligation on technology developers 
to include specific copy protections in their products.  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(2) (‘‘Nothing 
in this section shall require that the design of, or design and selection of parts and components 
for, a consumer electronics, telecommunications, or computing product provide for a response 
to any particular technological measure . . . .’’). 
105. As described in a letter to Senator Hollings from the United States Association for 
Computing Machinery (USACM): ‘‘Devices as disparate as electronic cameras, wrist watches, 
electric pianos, televisions, ATM machines, cell phones, home security systems, and medical 
equipment (among many examples) all process and display information electronically.  Under 
the proposed legislation, all would be required to support anti-copying protocols.’’  See Letter 
to Senator Ernest F. Hollings from United States Association for Computing Machinery, 
Sept.   26,   2001,   available  at  http://www.acm.org/usacm/SSSCA-letter.html   (hereinafter 
‘‘USACM letter’’) (last visited Sept. 29, 2003). This expansive reach runs counter to the 
Supreme Court’s insistence, in Sony, that copyright not burden free access to markets 
‘‘substantially unrelated’’ to copyright infringement. Sony, 464 U.S. 417, 441-42 (1984). 
106. For this reason, among others, a consortium of copyright holders and technology 
companies recently announced its opposition to Hollings-like legislation. The consortium, 
which includes the Recording Industry Association of America, the Business Software 
Alliance, and the Computer Systems Policy Project, released a seven-point list of ‘‘policy 
principles’’ that called for marketplace solutions to copy-protection challenges and pointed to 
education,  publicity,  and  private  enforcement  actions  as  the  core  strategies  for  reducing 
infringement. See Press Release, Business Software Alliance, Recording, Technology 
Industries Reach Groundbreaking Agreement on Approach to Digital Content Issues (Jan. 
14, 2003), available at http://www.bsa.org/usa/press/newsreleases//2003-01- 
14.1418.phtml?type=policy (last visited Sept. 29, 2003); see also Declan McCullagh, 
Copyright  Truce  Excludes  Key  Voices,  CNET  NEWS.COM,  Jan.  15,  2003,  available  at 
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-980671.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2003). 
107. See USACM letter (‘‘Inclusion of anti-copying technology in general purpose 
equipment ---- including real-time computing devices used in traffic control, air flight control, 
medical equipment, and manufacturing ---- adds to their complexity and potential for failure. 
Unexpected interactions with other code, and accidental activation of protection protocols 
cannot be ruled out in every case, and in many venues the potential for damage is extreme.’’). 
108. See Hearing on Protecting Content in a Digital Age, supra note 20, at 4-5 (statement 
of Robert A. Perry of the Home Recording Rights Coalition) (contending that content owners 
have sought copy protection standards that would prevent consumers from engaging in Sony- 
type home copying of off-air broadcasts). 
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At the other end of the spectrum from the Hollings scheme stands a 
series of compulsory licensing and levy proposals, described most 
convincingly by Professor Neil Netanel.109  Whereas the Hollings model 
would maintain a system of exclusive rights but would insist that 
technology developers help to enforce them, the levy approach would 
abandon exclusive rights (at least for certain works in certain media) and 
replace them with a system of technology-funded subsidization. As 
envisioned by Professor Netanel, the levy would apply to ‘‘commercial 
providers of all consumer products and services the value of which, the 
Copyright Office determines, P2P file swapping substantially 
enhances.’’110 A consortium of technology and copyright interests would 
decide upon appropriate levies for various technologies, and the proceeds 
would be allocated to copyright holders in an amount bearing some 
relationship to the relative popularity of their works on file-sharing 
networks. 
The levy proposal would arguably preserve the essential objectives of 
common law copyright. It would ensure some economic  reward to 
content creators; it would protect the public’s ability to engage in 
personal and other fair uses of copyrighted works; and it would allow -- 
indeed, encourage --    the growth of new technological platforms for 
content delivery.  In the abstract, then, the model has significant appeal. 
Despite these advantages, however, the levy model poses a number 
of challenges and imposes significant ongoing costs. The few existing 
compulsory licensing experiments in copyright law have faced criticism as 
inflexible, unwieldy, and non-responsive to changes in the way  that 
people use and respond to creative content.111    The task of determining 
 
 
109. See Netanel, supra note 15; see also William T. Fisher, A Royalties Plan for File 
Sharing, CNET NEWS.COM, July 11,  2003,  at  http://news.com.com/2010-1071- 
1024856.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2003) (proposing compulsory licensing scheme for peer-to- 
peer file trading); cf. Brandon Mitchener, German Mediator Recommends Copyright Levy on 
Computers, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Feb. 5, 2003, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
0,,SB1044385225838491533,00.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2003) (describing existing European 
levies on recording devices, as well as recent recommendation by German mediator that levies 
be assessed on PCs and distributed to copyright owners through existing collecting societies). 
But see P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Lucie Guibault & Sjoerd van Geffen, The Future of Levies in a 
Digital Environment: Final Report (2003), available at http://www.ivir.nl/publications/other/ 
DRM%20Levies%20Final%20Report.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2003) (opposing the expansion 
of copyright levies in Europe). 
110. Netanel, supra note 15, at 32. 
111. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1642-45 (2001) (describing problems with statutory royalty and levy 
schemes); Gordon, supra note 32, at 858-59 (outlining problems with compulsory licensing 
schemes generally); Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property 
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L.  REV. 1293, 1308-1316 (1996) 
(criticizing the mechanical license  and other compulsory licensing  regimes in intellectual 
property law); Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. 
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and allocating royalties has confounded those charged with it, even in 
situations involving a discrete group of players, such as music copyright 
holders and digital broadcasters who play their works.112 These 
difficulties may swell to the breaking point in a compulsory licensing 
scheme broad enough to encompass all technologies that benefit from 
file-sharing networks and all creative content traded on such networks.113 
Like the Hollings proposal, moreover, the levy scheme involves a subsidy 
by the non-file-sharing public. The subsidy operates in a somewhat 
different way --    under the Hollings bill, the public would subsidize 
copyright holders’ technological protection scheme, whereas the levy 
would involve a monetary payment from technology purchasers to 
copyright holders to compensate for unauthorized file-sharing. 
Nonetheless, because the tax would apply to a wide range of digital 
technologies without regard to their use by the purchaser, the levy would 
represent a wealth transfer from technology users generally toward those 
who get the most value from file-sharing activity.114 
At root, both the Hollings and the levy proposals rest on an 
assumption that existing infringement standards no longer represent the 
optimal way to achieve copyright’s objectives in an era of digital file- 




DAYTON L. REV. 547, 583 (1997) (noting unwieldiness of cable and satellite retransmission 
compulsory license rules, and contending that any corollary on-line would be even more 
complex); see also Jenna Greene, Royalty Arbitration Targeted on Hill: Congress Thought it 
had Found a More Efficient Way to Decide Copyright Royalties. Now that Reform is Under 
Question., LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 21, 2003, at 1 (cataloguing shortcomings of past copyright 
royalty proceedings). 
112. See Royalty Rate Is Set for Web Use, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2003, at B5 (describing 
temporary truce in longstanding dispute between Internet radio operators and  labels  and 
artists); Jim Hu, Webcasters, RIAA Propose New Royalties, CNET NEWS.COM, Apr. 3, 
2003, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-995470.html (last visited May 14, 2003). 
113. This is not to say that a compulsory license scheme would not present a feasible 
alternative for technologies that bear a more symbiotic relationship to infringement, including 
those that would not exist but for their infringing applications. See Dogan, supra note 58, at 
958 n. 97 (suggesting damages, rather than injunctions, as appropriate relief against parties 
whose  technologies  owe  their  existence  to  infringement  but  have  proven  non-infringing 
applications). Congress took such an approach in the Audio Home Recording Act of 1996, 
see infra text at notes 77-78, and it could apply equally to other technologies primarily used for 
infringement. Whether particular copying and storage media owe their existence to 
infringement is an empirical matter that falls beyond the scope of this article. 
Of course, it is equally plausible that the risk of legal liability, or the advantage of 
authorized access to content, will induce manufacturers of such technologies to engage in an ex 
ante, private bargaining process with copyright holders to ensure the protection of copyrighted 
content. See, e.g., Lauren Wiley, BPDG Proposes ‘‘Broadcast Flag’’ to Protect DVD 
Broadcasts, EMEDIA LIVE, June 24, 2002, available at http://www.emedialive.com/r10/ 
2002/news0802_02.html (last visited May 14, 2003). 
114. For a more detailed discussion of the efficiency and fairness concerns associated with 
such a reallocation, see Lunney, supra note 17, at 855-56. 
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made its first appearance --    deserves its own critical attention before 
serving as the departure point for a new copyright paradigm. Before we 
embark on a radical overhaul of copyright, we should make sure that the 
existing system is broken. Particularly, given the significant costs of the 
proposed alternatives, Congress should not turn to them without some 
clear evidence that existing legal tools cannot bring infringement to a 
manageable level.115 
 
III. THE CASE FOR COMMON LAW 
 
Existing law gives copyright holders an important tool that they 
have only recently begun to utilize in the file-sharing context: the direct 
infringement suit. 116 While this alternative comes with its own risks and 
costs, it offers a number of benefits relative to the overhaul options 
outlined above. Ultimately, its efficacy will turn on an untested empirical 
question: whether legal action against end users will deter enough file- 
sharing to preserve an acceptable balance between copyright holders and 
the broader public. No one can predict the answer to that question, but 
experience, logic, and early returns suggest that the longstanding rules of 
direct infringement may represent the best hope for accommodating the 
competing objectives of copyright. 
Perhaps the strongest argument for a direct infringement approach 
is that it has for centuries represented the most effective means of 
preserving copyright’s incentives while maintaining the integrity of 
unrelated markets. By providing rights against those who actually value 
(and use) copyrighted works, infringement law allows copyright holders 
to receive rewards that bear some relationship to the value of their 





115. Advocates of a levy contend that, even if existing standards could rein in 
infringement, they would do so at a tremendous cost, both in resources devoted to 
enforcement and in lost creative and consumptive consumer utility. See infra note 23. They 
have a point, but the levy proposals themselves implicate immense measurement, bureaucratic 
and transactional costs, making it difficult to say with confidence that their adoption would 
result in net efficiency gains. 
116. Copyright holders have recently begun to utilize this strategy. See, e.g., Lynette 
Holloway, Recording Industry to Sue Internet Music Swappers, N. Y. TIMES, June 26, 2003, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/26/technology/26MUSI.html (last visited June 
26, 2003) (reporting that recording industry association planned to file ‘‘at  least  several 
hundred civil and criminal lawsuits’’ against file-sharers within several weeks; see generally 
Michael Geist, ‘Big Music’ Set to Declare War on its Audience, TORONTO STAR, May 12, 
2003, available at http://shorl.com/degotredralako (last visited May 12, 2003) (‘‘the outcome of 
the [Grokster] case [discussed infra note 96] suggests that the recording industry may now 
turn its attention with renewed vigour toward the actual individuals who engage in file sharing, 
since a finding of copyright infringement is much easier to obtain in those cases’’). 
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them.117 A focus on direct infringers rather than on technological tools, 
moreover, ensures that technologies and services that have significant 
non-infringing applications can develop without interference by 
copyright holders. 
A direct infringement model, of course, can achieve its economic 
objectives only if it leads to licensed transactions in copyrighted works.118 
In the file-sharing context, this means that it must cause a critical mass 
of users to abandon file-sharing in favor of licensed music products.119 
At first glance, such a result appears unlikely. Given the worldwide 
dispersion of file-sharing activities and the difficulty of pursuing end 
users, copyright holders can feasibly pursue only a tiny fraction of those 
engaged in unauthorized file-sharing. Optimal deterrence theory 
suggests that in these circumstances, only an astronomical penalty would 




117. Cf. Lunney, supra note 17, at 856 (noting that subsidization of infringement by non- 
infringing technology users can result in inefficiencies and inequities); Gordon, supra note 32, 
at 868-69 (explaining superiority of markets over courts in setting prices for use of intellectual 
property). 
118. Wendy Gordon has described this as one of the two critical requisites for the 
‘‘asymmetric market failure’’ justification for intellectual property law: 
‘‘The first condition is that authors and inventors would not be able to obtain much 
payment for their work in the absence of a rule that restrained strangers from 
copying, and, as a result, potential creators produce fewer works than the public 
would have been willing to pay for. . . . The second condition for asymmetric 
market failure is that once a no-copy rule is put in place, licensing will evolve. In 
other words, the second condition is met if, in the presence of a copyright or some 
other rule restraining strangers from copying, markets will succeed, not fail.’’ 
Gordon, supra note 32, at 854. 
119. It need not convert all users; as discussed above, copyright has always been ‘‘leaky,’’ 
and copyright holders have never appropriated all of the value of their works. Because the 
transaction costs associated with creation and distribution of copyrighted works are rapidly 
decreasing, moreover, it may take less of an economic incentive to encourage people to engage 
in these activities.  Cf. Ku, supra note 16, at 300 (contending that the Internet eliminates the 
need for a financial incentive to distributors: ‘‘When content is distributed  through  the 
Internet, the public internalizes the costs of distribution.’’). 
120. Under the traditional formula, ‘‘the ideal penalty (insofar as deterrence is concerned) 
equals the harm caused by the violation multiplied by one over the probability of punishment.’’ 
Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 2185, 2186 (1999) (describing this prescription as ‘‘the multiplier principle’’ 
and citing sources). See also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An 
Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 873-74 (1998) (contending that punitive 
damages should apply ‘‘only if an injurer has a chance of escaping liability for the harm he 
causes,’’ and that penalties in such cases must ‘‘exceed compensatory damages so that, on 
average, they will pay for the harm that they cause’’). Cf. Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology 
of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 115, 121 (1993) (citing research that 
‘‘suggests that the uncertainty whether an injured person with a meritorious tort claim will 
pursue it undermines deterrence, and that the remote possibility of a large damage award does 
little to further the goal of deterrence’’). 
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Despite these theoretical objections, a number of features of the 
current file-sharing environment make it plausible that direct 
infringement suits may reduce unauthorized file-sharing. For one thing, 
while file-sharing has changed the nature of content distribution from 
top-down to end-to-end, it appears to retain a certain centralized 
structure. Studies suggest that ninety percent of the content available on 
file-sharing networks is provided by a mere ten percent of the individuals 
on those networks.121 By identifying and pursuing some subset of those 
individuals, copyright holders could make other high volume sharers 
perceive a non-negligible risk of detection, and could potentially reduce 
the supply of unauthorized content.122 
Even the more moderate file-sharer may well be deterred by the 
threat of legal action, especially as legitimate alternatives to unauthorized 
file-sharing emerge. Through well-publicized lawsuits and criminal 
actions, copyright holders and government authorities can bring a 
message to the public that individuals engaged in file-sharing are 
violating the law, and face stiff penalties if they continue their behavior. 
This message --    which the RIAA has only recently asserted with any 
conviction123 --    was notably absent in the early legal actions involving 
peer-to-peer networks. These actions focused solely on intermediaries. 
There is solid precedent for such an end-user approach: the software 
industry has had measurable success in its campaign to reduce business 
software piracy through a strategy that combines high-profile, well- 
publicized legal actions with cease and desist letters to others suspected 




121. See John Borland, Record Labels Mull Suits Against File-Traders, CNET 
NEWS.COM,  July  3,  2002,  available  at  http://news.com.com/2100-1023-941547.html  (last 
visited May 29, 2003) (citing study of Gnutella users conducted by Xerox’s Palo Alto Research 
Center  (PARC)). 
122. See id. (‘‘Discouraging this 10 percent of ‘providers’ would go a long way in reducing 
the amount of content available through file-swapping networks, industry insiders say); cf. 
German   Police   Swoop   on   File-Swappers,   REUTERS,   May   8,   2003,   available   at 
http://uk.news.yahoo.com/030508/80/dzjlm.html (describing arrest, by German police, of 25- 
year-old student who used a file-sharing network ‘‘to distribute over a million MP3 music files 
daily to some 3,000 individual users over a period of weeks’’). 
123. See, e.g., Declan McCullagh, Antipiracy Détente Announced, CNET NEWS.COM, 
Jan. 14, 2003, available at http://www.news.com.com/2100-1023-980633.html (last visited 
May  14,  2003)  (describing  announcement,  by  coalition  of  content  providers,  of  plan  to 
abandon legislative agenda in favor of public education and piracy actions). 
124. See Lisa M. Bowman, File-Traders in the Crosshairs, CNET NEWS.COM, July 15, 
2002, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-943881.html (last visited May 29, 2003) 
(noting recording industry’s plans to model antipiracy campaign after software industry’s 
efforts); see also Study: Software Piracy on the Wane, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 5, 2003, 
available at http://news.com.com/2100-1012_3-5060288.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2003) 
(noting drop in unauthorized copying of business software, reported by software antipiracy 
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well stop doing so if they understood the illegality of their action and 
even the remote risk of legal sanction against them. 
At the same time, widespread file-sharing would likely continue if 
the content industries failed to offer attractive alternatives in a format 
that appealed to the public. In the past, individuals trying to decide 
whether to use KaZaA balanced the benefits it brought them. Either 
enjoy free music, and bear the costs of file sharing, which include the 
psychic cost of illegal behavior and the risk of getting caught, or make a 
$17 purchase of a compact disc. But as the industry changes the price 
structure of its offerings and makes music available in more discrete, 
affordable packages, the benefits of file-sharing are diminishing relative 
to purchase of legal content.125 The early success of Apple’s ITunes, 
which has already spurred numerous competing single-song distribution 
services, demonstrates that the cost-benefit analysis, for many consumers, 
will shift as attractive legal alternatives emerge. Indeed, the labels may 
ultimately decide to get involved in peer-to-peer networks themselves.126 
Given all of the benefits from direct infringement suits, it might 
seem odd that copyright holders have only recently begun to file them. 
To some extent, their initial reticence may have resulted from legal and 
technological uncertainty over the feasibility of identifying and suing 
individual file-sharers. Recently, however, the technology has evolved to 
identify such individuals,127 and courts have held that copyright holders 
may use the DMCA subpoena power to obtain personal information 




organization); http://www.bsa.org/usa/press/education/ (press releases describing settlements 
of legal actions against businesses using unlicensed software). 
125. Apple Computer aggressively entered the market for per-song downloads in April 
2003, see Pui-Wing Tam, Apple Launches Online Store Offering Downloadable Music, 
WALL ST. J., April 29, 2003, at B8. See also David Bank, RealNetworks Is Launching Its 
Own Online-Music Network Users; Few Reasons to Continue Therapy, WALL ST. J., May 
28, 2003 (describing RealNetworks service that offers downloads of songs for 79 cents a track); 
Anna Wilde Matthews and Nick Wingfield, Apple’s Planned Music Service for Windows 
Draws Rivals, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2003, at B1 (describing Apple Computer’s planned 
iTunes for Windows and its anticipated competition in per-song download services). See also 
Brian Steinberg, Advertising: MovieLink’s Ads Lure and Lampoon, WALL ST. J., Sept. 24, 
2003, at B4 (describing advertising initiative by movie studios to promote authorized movie 
downloads). 
126. See Michael J. Wolf, Musical Bandits, WALL ST. J., May 1, 2003, at A18 (predicting 
that music labels will ultimately join forces with file-sharing services and convert them into 
revenue generators). 
127. Recording Industry Reveals How Stealth, Sleuthing Track Piracy, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
28, 2003, at B5 (describing techniques used by RIAA to identify users engaged in infringing 
file-sharing). 
128. In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 24 (D.D.C. 2003); see also John 
Healey, Could Copyright Cops Be on your E-Trail?, NEWSDAY, Mar. 4, 2003, at A41 
(describing technologies used to track down end users engaged in file-sharing); Amy Harmon, 
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decision, which found file-sharing straightforward infringement,129 
copyright holders have strong legal footing for direct infringement 
claims. More likely, the music industry’s reluctance stemmed from a fear 
of alienating their customers --    of suing the very individuals whom they 
hoped would buy their products.130 As their intermediary suits falter and, 
at least in the short term, do little to stem the tide of online 
infringement, end-user legal actions have emerged as the only feasible 
short-term alternative. 
In the summer of 2003, the Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA) took its first steps toward bringing actions against end 
users. It issued subpoenas for the identity of thousands of end users that 
it alleged were engaged in unauthorized trading of copyrighted music 
files.131 While several service providers and end users have challenged the 
subpoenas,132 others have complied, and in September the RIAA filed 
hundreds of suits against alleged file traders.133 Although it is far too 
early to know whether these legal actions will have any lasting effect on 
end-user behavior, some early surveys suggest that the threat of lawsuits 
is already reducing demand for file-sharing services.134 
Finally, copyright holders increasingly have allies in their efforts to 




U.S. Backs Record Labels in Pursuit of Music Sharer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2003 (describing 
Justice Department brief in support of district court’s decision in Verizon). 
129. A&M  Records,  Inc.  v.  Napster,  Inc.,  239  F.3d  1004  (2001);  see  also  Metro- 
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1034 (2003) (holding 
that downloading music files on file-sharing network infringes exclusive rights to distribute 
and reproduce copyrighted works). 
130. See Declan McCullagh, End of an Era for File-Sharing Chic?, CNET NEWS.COM, 
Aug. 25, 2003, at http://news.com.com/2010-1071-5067473.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2003) 
(‘‘what the RIAA’s lawyers and lobbyists fear, they admitted in private conversations . . ., is a 
public backlash’’). 
131. See Music Industry Gets Edge in Piracy Fight, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2003, at C13 
(reporting on the 871 subpoenas already issued by the recording industry, ‘‘with roughly 75 
new subpoenas being approved each day’’). 
132. See, e.g., Complaint in Pacific Bell Internet Servs. v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., 
No. 03-3560 (N.D. Cal. filed Jul. 30, 2003), at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/ 
PacBell_v_RIAA.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2003). 
133. See Nick Wingfield & Ethan Smith, Record Industry Files Suit Against 261 Music 
Uploaders; Move May Alienate Customers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2003, at B1 (noting suits 
filed against 261 individuals, each of whom allegedly offered over 1,000 files for download on 
file-sharing networks). 
134. See Lisa M. Bowman, Are Swappers Scared of the RIAA?, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 
21, 2003, at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5066632.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2003) 
(describing report that showed sharp drop in file-sharing after the RIAA issued its subpoenas). 
But see Leslie Walker, Big-Time File Swappers Still at Large, THE WASHINGTON POST, 
Aug. 24, 2003, at F7 (noting report that showed recent reduction in households engaged in file 
swapping, but suggested that the RIAA’s ‘‘legal campaign against file swappers is only scaring 
‘light downloaders’ rather than the big fish the RIAA says it wants to catch’’). 
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and employees are gobbling bandwidth with their rampant use of file- 
sharing services. Unlike the providers of file-sharing technologies -- 
whose incentive lies in disseminating the software and encouraging as 
many file transfers as possible135 --    these Internet access providers have a 
self-interest in policing their networks to prevent misuse of their 
bandwidth.136   In some cases, that self-interest competes with an interest 
in satisfied customers, but as the legal status of unauthorized file-sharing 
becomes more settled and the cost of complying with subpoenas 
escalates,137 many intermediaries have sought ways to push their users 
toward legal alternatives.138 Some have addressed the problem by 
limiting the bandwidth available to their users; others have begun to 
monitor the content transmitted to or from their network.139     Congress 
 
 
135. Grokster and other decentralized file-sharing networks make money on advertising: 
‘‘The  more  individuals  who  download  the  software,  the  more  advertising  revenue  [they] 
collect.’’ Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 1029, 1044 
(C.D. Cal. 2003); see also Alex Frangos, Eluding a New Web Hazard, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 
2003, at D1 (describing ‘‘spyware,’’ software that automatically installs on the computers of 
those who download KaZaA and other file-sharing programs, tracks users’ Web browsing, and 
generates pop-up ads that correspond to their perceived preferences). 
136. See John Borland, Businesses Boosting Anti-P2P Software, CNET NEWS.COM, 
Aug. 27, 2003, at http://news.com.com/2100-1035-5068950.html (‘‘the discovery of activity 
that’s taking up large amounts of bandwidth and exposing the company to potential legal 
liability is exactly the type of revelation that’s persuading a growing number of companies to do 
something about file swapping’’); John Borland, Labels Turn Guns on Workplace Pirates, 
CNET NEWS.COM, Feb. 13, 2003, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1023- 
984548.html?tag=bplst (last visited May 30, 2003) (quoting network security executive whose 
business clients are seeking to eliminate unauthorized file-sharing: ‘‘‘Bandwidth and resource 
consumption is the real driver for them.’’). 
137. The expense of complying with the subpoenas has driven some internet service 
providers to question the RIAA’s recent subpoena drive, and at least one ISP has challenged 
the constitutionality of the subpoenas served by the RIAA. See John Borland, ISP Group 
Challenges   RIAA   Subpoenas,   CNET    NEWS.COM,   Aug.   11,   2003,   available   at 
http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5062372.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2003) (noting legal 
challenges to subpoenas, as well as letter sent by Internet company trade association requesting 
dialog with RIAA and stating, ‘‘Smaller ISPs, whose limited resources are already being 
exhausted by legitimate law enforcement requests, simply cannot afford to underwrite legal 
fishing expeditions and still provide services for their customers.’’). 
138. See John Borland, Colleges Make Dent in Campus P2P, CNET NEWS.COM, Sept. 
2, 2003, at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5070407.html (noting ‘‘considerable progress’’ 
made by colleges and the entertainment industry in reducing infringement on campuses); John 
Borland, Colleges Explore Legal Net Music Setups, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 1, 2003, 
available at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5059030.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2003) 
(describing  initiative  by  university  consortium  to  provide  legal,  on-campus  alternative  to 
unauthorized file-sharing: ‘‘The rampant use of file-swapping services has flooded 
[universities’] internal networks with unpredictable data traffic and has exposed their students 
and even the institutions themselves to the potential of legal liability. Sponsoring legitimate 
services would remove those headaches, some university administrators believe.’’). 
139. See John Borland, Fingerprinting P2P Pirates, CNET NEWS.COM, Feb. 20, 2003, 
available at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-985027.html (describing University of 
Wyoming’s use of software that monitors content of data flowing through its network). 
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has also pressured universities to discipline individuals engaged in 
widespread swapping of copyrighted files.140 While it would offend the 
principles  underlying  Sony  to  impose  a  legal  obligation  upon  these 
conduits to eliminate unauthorized file-sharing, their de facto role in 
diminishing the behavior cannot be ignored. 
From the public’s perspective, then, an infringement-oriented 
approach has a number of benefits. It preserves copyright incentives 
while maintaining pressure on content industries to make their products 
available on attractive terms to compete with --    rather than eliminating -- 
alternative forms of content delivery. It also would continue the existing 
prohibition on copyright holder interference with technology,141 would 
impose the cost of access to content upon those who most value it, and 
would maintain the principles of fair use. 
Despite all of these advantages, I do not contend that the 
infringement-oriented approach will necessarily solve the current 
dilemma in copyright law. It raises its own problems, and only time will 
tell whether it will prove adequate to preserve copyright’s incentives in a 
digital age. Nonetheless, some of the apparent flaws in the model are 
either inherent and appropriate, or easily addressed. 
First, some might argue that direct infringement suits cannot 
adequately stem infringement over peer-to-peer networks --    either 
because deterrence will not work or because legal actions will simply 
exacerbate the public animosity toward recording labels. 142 To some 
extent, this is an empirical question whose answer depends on the cost- 
benefit analysis of individual Internet users and the viability of 
alternatives to file-sharing. Only time will tell whether the combination 
of negative deterrence and positive draw from competing products will 
stem infringement to any significant degree. It bears emphasis, 
moreover, that copyright has never aspired to achieve perfect 
enforcement; it seeks only to preserve the basic contours of markets for 
copyrighted works. If direct infringement suits can achieve this in the 
new digital environment, then existing law will have proven itself capable 




140. See Declan McCullagh, Congress Targets P2P Piracy on Campus, CNET 
NEWS.COM, Feb. 26, 2003, available at http://news.com.com/2100-1028-986143.html (last 
visited May 29, 2003). 
141. See Ginsburg, Copyright and Control, 101 COLUM. L. REV. at 1645-46 (‘‘[T]he 
conclusion that a compulsory license regime is better for authors than exclusive rights presumes 
that authors are obliged in practice to give up their rights to a publisher; it disregards the 
potential of digital media to free authors from the corporate distributors on whom  they 
depended to bring their work to the public.’’). 
142. Wolf, supra note 126 (‘‘Suing the people you hope will be your customers is always a 
dubious approach.’’). 
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Second, a number  of commentators have bemoaned the 
arbitrariness of a direct infringement strategy and the disproportional 
penalties faced by those unlucky enough to fall into the trap of copyright 
law.143 These problems are inherent in any legal system that relies on 
deterrence to make up for imperfect enforcement. In the case of file- 
sharing, they may prove temporary; because the emergence of alternative 
legal products is coinciding with the content industries’ enforcement 
campaign, an increasing number of individuals may well begin to make 
alternative choices.144 Additionally, because the recording industry in 
these cases will likely take an approach similar to the software industry’s 
recent campaigns, most of the targeted individuals will receive no more 
than notice through a cease-and-desist letter. 
Third, while this Article has focused only on domestic strategies, 
piracy is a global phenomenon, and file-sharing is rampant around the 
world. Certainly, the global nature of the Internet presents immense 
enforcement challenges, but copyright holders seeking to capture global 
markets have always pursued infringers on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction 
basis. The strategies discussed in this Article apply equally across 
jurisdictions, and copyright holders seeking to preserve markets outside 
the United States should arguably pursue similar strategies in those 
jurisdictions.145 Antipiracy campaigns in software, music, and movies are 
already global, and copyright owners have to enforce their rights around 
the world. A global campaign against high-volume music traders may 
well have a deterrent effect, at least to some extent, and at least enough 




143. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 17, at 851-52 (‘‘At some point, a point copyright law 
may already have reached, the level of punishment required to deter private copying generally 
will simply become unjust.’’); Landes & Lichtman, supra note 6, at 408 (arguing against direct 
liability in cases involving widespread wrongdoing and low probability of detection, such as the 
direct actions against video game pirates in the 1980s: ‘‘because detection and litigation were so 
expensive, direct liability in this instance led to almost random penalties; of the millions of 
equally culpable computer users, only a handful were dragged into court. To many, the 
injustice of a legal right enforced that randomly outweighed whatever benefit those lawsuits 
offered.’’). 
144. If end-user deterrence succeeds in changing the social norms of peer-to-peer 
networks, the social costs and enforcement costs from an end-user campaign will fade over 
time. In contrast, the costs from the alternative schemes discussed in this Article ---- including 
the administrative costs of a levy, the efficiency losses due to subsidization of file-sharing users, 
and the Hollings scheme’s imposition of suboptimal technology ---- would continue as long as 
either the levy or the digital rights management system was in place. 
145. In some jurisdictions, authorities have already begun enforcement efforts against 
individuals. See, e.g., Jennifer Clark, Italian Authorities Crack Down on File Sharing Over the 
Internet, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, June 3, 2003, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
0,,SB105465539661755199,00.html (last visited June 4, 2003) (describing new Italian anti- 
file-sharing legislation that enables ‘‘a vast police clampdown on file sharing’’). 
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Fourth, an infringement-centered approach, particularly one that 
relies on unilateral subpoenas, could be subject to abuse by copyright 
holders seeking personal identities for illegitimate purposes including 
harassment and strike suits. This concern is not an  abstract  one;  a 
number of Internet service providers have challenged the 
constitutionality of the subpoenas issued by the RIAA in recent months, 
claiming that the subpoenas are technically inadequate and provide 
insufficient notice and opportunity for challenge by end users.146 For the 
most part, these flaws are addressable, either through re-filing in 
appropriate venues, through compensation and notice by plaintiffs, or by 
a requirement that plaintiffs file suit to establish a case or controversy 
before issuing subpoenas for users’ identity. In any event, policymakers 
can avoid abuse of subpoena power by interpreting the power narrowly 
and providing stiff sanctions for its bad faith use.147 
Finally, the press is already reporting the development of file- 
sharing networks and other end-to-end technologies that will mask the 
identity of end users, making identification and pursuit of direct 
infringers much more difficult.148 To the extent that these technologies 
evolve and present attractive alternatives, they will certainly alter the 
cost-benefit calculus of users, and they may well reduce the deterrent 
effect of a direct infringement approach. But it seems at least possible 
that the reduction will be slight. The more effort required to acquire an 
MP3 file, and the more it requires acts that appear to evade the law, the 
more individuals may be deterred and look to legal channels. The more 
sophisticated the technology, moreover, the higher the price in terms of 




146. See Complaint in Pacific Bell Internet Servs. v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., No. 
03-3560 (N.D. Cal. filed Jul. 30, 2003), at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/PacBell_v_RIAA.pdf 
(last visited Sept. 4, 2003); see also John Borland, RIAA Turns Up Heat on Subpoena Fighter, 
CNET  NEWS.COM,  Aug.  27,  2003,  at  http://news.com.com/2100-1027-5069019.html  (last 
visited Sept. 4, 2003) (describing legal challenge brought by a unanimous user to prevent her 
ISP from turning over information in response to RIAA subpoena). 
147. In a case involving the general subpoena power under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, for example, the Ninth Circuit recently found that an overbroad, abusive subpoena 
issued to an Internet service provider violated federal electronic privacy and computer fraud 
statutes. Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 341 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2003) (‘‘The subpoena power is a 
substantial delegation of authority to private parties, and those who invoke it have a grave 
responsibility to ensure it is not abused.’’). 
148. See, e.g., Online  Music Pirates  Dodge Capture, BBC NEWS, Mar. 18, 2003, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/technology/2860757.stm (last visited  Mar. 
19, 2003) (describing file sharers’ increasing use of ‘‘port-hopping,’’ or use of random ports, to 
evade detection by music industry and ISPs). 
149. See Declan McCullagh, P2P’s Little Secret, CNET  NEWS.COM, July 8, 2003, at 
http://news.com.com/2100-1029-1023735.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2003) (noting decreased 
efficiency and usability of anonymous and fully decentralized file-sharing services). 
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Given the realistic possibility that deterrence will work, we should 
give the direct infringement strategy a chance before changing our entire 
copyright system. Recent history suggests that technology will continue 
to evolve in ways that enable infringers to avoid the costs of copyright, 
and that copyright holders cannot effectively control those technologies. 
Given that reality --    and the costs that go along with any radical 
reallocation of copyright costs --    policyholders should  encourage 
copyright holders to pursue strategies to deter behavior at the ends and 
reduce demand for illegal content, rather than deluding themselves into 




Given the nascent state of  peer-to-peer technology  and the 
breakneck speed of technological development, no one can say with 
confidence whether, and to what extent, legal efforts will ever reduce 
infringement on file-sharing networks. Undoubtedly, this uncertainty 
has contributed to the clamor for a targeted legislative fix. Such reactive 
legislation, however, rarely solves cutting-edge dilemmas more effectively 
than common law solutions.150 
The common law of copyright infringement did not evolve 
accidentally, but through a deliberate balancing of the interests of 
copyright holders and those of the public. Before upsetting that balance 
in favor of a broader sharing of the costs of copyright by technology users 
generally, policymakers should have confidence that current infringement 
standards can no longer serve copyright’s objectives in a digital age. This 
Article has suggested some of the reasons to believe that they can, and 

















150. Cf. Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common Law in 
Cyberspace, 55 VAND. L. REV. 309 (2002). 
